To make high-quality research more accessible and easier to explore.

Fields:
2 results ✕ Clear filters

Ambiguous Business Cycles

American Economic Review 2014 104(8), 2368-2399
This paper studies a New Keynesian business cycle model with agents who are averse to ambiguity (Knightian uncertainty). Shocks to confidence about future TFP are modeled as changes in ambiguity. To assess the size of those shocks, our estimation uses not only data on standard macro variables, but also incorporates the dispersion of survey forecasts about growth as a measure of confidence. Our main result is that TFP and confidence shocks together can explain roughly two thirds of business cycle frequency movements in the major macro aggregates. Confidence shocks account for about 70 percent of this variation. (JEL D81, D84, E12, E32)

Financial contagion and asset pricing

Journal of Banking & Finance 2014 47, 296-308 open access
Asset market interconnectedness can give rise to significant contagion risks during periods of financial crises that extend beyond the risks associated with changes in volatilities and correlations. These channels include the transmission of shocks operating through changes in the higher order comoments of asset returns, including changes in coskewness arising from changes in the interaction between volatility and average returns across asset markets. These additional contagion channels have nontrivial implications for the pricing of options through changes in the payoff probability structure and more generally, in the management of financial risks. The effects of incorrectly pricing risk has proved to be significant during many financial crises, including the subprime crisis from mid 2007 to mid 2008, the Great Recession beginning 2008 and the European debt crisis from 2010. Using an exchange options model, the effects of changes in the comoments of asset returns across asset markets are investigated with special emphasis given to understanding the effects on hedging risk during financial crises. The results reveal that by not correctly pricing the risks arising from higher order moments during financial crises, there is significant mispricing of options, while hedged portfolios during noncrisis periods become exposed to price movements in times of crises.