Should managers, when taking investment decisions, follow the signals given by the stock market even when those do not coincide with their own assessment of fundamentals? Do they? In this paper we review theoretical arguments and examine the empirical evidence. First, we look at the relation between investment, market valuation, and proxies for fundamentals over the last 90 years. Second, we look at the behavior of investment during the episodes associated with the crashes of 1929 and 1987. We find a limited role of market valuation, given fundamentals.

We propose an explanation for the wide variation in rates of taxation across developed economies, based on differences in labor market institutions. In "corporatist" economies, which feature centralized labor markets, taxes on labor input will be less distortionary than when labor supply is determined individually. Since the level of labor supply is set by a small group of decision-makers, these individuals will recognize the linkage between the taxes that workers pay and the benefits that they receive. Labor tax burdens are indeed higher in more corporatist nations, and non-labor taxes are lower, which is consistent with this theory. There is also some evidence that the distortionary effects of labor taxes are lower in more corporatist economies.