We study the performance of collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) to understand the market imperfections giving rise to these vehicles and their corresponding economic costs. CLO equity tranches earn positive abnormal returns from the risk‐adjusted price differential between leveraged loans and CLO debt tranches. Debt tranches offer higher returns than similarly rated corporate bonds, making them attractive to banks and insurers that face risk‐based capital requirements. Temporal variation in equity performance highlights the resilience of CLOs to market volatility due to their closed‐end structure, long‐term funding, and embedded options to reinvest principal proceeds.

A key feature of the 2007 financial crisis is that for many securities trading had ceased; where trading did occur, market prices were well below intrinsic values, especially for ABS CDOs. One explanation is that information had been asymmetric, with sellers having better information than buyers. We first show the information advantages sellers had over buyers in both the issuance of CDOs and, through vertical integration, performance of the CDO collateral that could well have disrupted trading after the onset of the crisis. Using a “workhorse” model for pricing securities under asymmetric information and a novel dataset, we show how adverse selection could explain why the bulk of these securities either traded at significant discounts or did not trade at all.