When choosing a flexible functional form to model multioutput cost structures, one is quickly confronted with severe violations of certain regularity conditions over large regions of output space. This paper explicitly imposes regional properness on the parameter space of flexible functional forms. The apparent trade-off between functional flexibility and functional properness has been identified for the case of the quadratic cost function. Using the quadratic cost function, the proposed procedure is illustrated with an application to the Bell System. The results suggest that the telecommunication industry in the United States--prior to the Bell System break-up--was a natural monopoly.

This paper evaluates the economies of scale and scope in the French mutual funds (SICAV) industry. This segment of the financial sector offers the unique characteristic that some firms specialize, while others supply several products. The results suggest economies of scale and scope for small institutions and diseconomies for larger firms. An appropriate size for a diversified company is in the range of FF 2.9 billion.

Using data on prices, production, and exports, we are able to identify marginal costs as well as the effectiveness of the Norwegian cement industry cartel. We find that our marginal cost estimates are very much in line with the detailed cost accounting data. We show that the cement cartel has been ineffective because the sharing rule induces “overproduction” and exporting below marginal costs. It is consumers — not firms — who benefit from the sharing rule. The ineffectiveness of the cartel was becoming so large that domestic welfare of a merger to monopoly would be positive around 1968, which is when the merger actually took place! We also show that competition would have resulted in even higher welfare gains over the entire sample.

In this paper we investigate how telecommunications infrastructure affects economic growth. We use evidence from 21 OECD countries over a 20-year period to examine the impacts that telecommunications developments may have had. We jointly estimate a micromodel for telecommunication investment with a macro production function. We find evidence of a significant positive causal link, especially when a critical mass of telecommunications infrastructure is present. Interestingly, the critical mass appears to be at a level of telecommunications infrastructure that is near universal service.

This paper tests whether upstream R&D cooperation leads to downstream collusion. We show that a sufficient condition for identifying collusive behavior is a decline in the market share of firms participating in research joint ventures (RJVs). Using information from the U.S. National Cooperation Research Act, we estimate a market share equation correcting for the endogeneity of RJV participation and R&D expenditures. We find robust evidence that large networks between direct competitors, created through firms being members in several RJVs at the same time, are conducive to collusive outcomes in the product market that reduce consumer welfare. By contrast, RJVs among noncompetitors are efficiency enhancing.