We use a new firm-level dataset that establishes the location, ownership, and activity of 650,000 multinational subsidiaries. Using a combination of four-digit-level information and input-output tables, we find the share of vertical FDI (subsidiaries that provide inputs to their parent firms) to be larger than commonly thought, even within developed countries. Most subsidiaries are not readily explained by the comparative advantage considerations whereby multinationals locate activities abroad to take advantage of factor cost differences. Instead, multinationals tend to own the stages of production proximate to their final production, giving rise to a class of high-skill, intra-industry vertical FDI.

We explore the real effects of bank-lending shocks and how they permeate the economy through buyer-supplier linkages. We combine administrative data on all Spanish firms with a matched bank-firm-loan dataset of all corporate loans from 2003 to 2013 to estimate firm-specific credit supply shocks for each year. We compute firm-specific measures of exposure to bank lending shocks of customers (upstream propagation) and suppliers (downstream propagation). Our findings suggest that credit supply shocks have sizable direct and downstream propagation effects on employment, investment, and output, especially during the 2008–2009 crisis, but no significant impact on employment during the expansion. We provide evidence that both trade credit extended by suppliers and price adjustments in general equilibrium explain downstream propagation of credit shocks.

We examine the empirical role of different explanations for the lack of capital flows from rich to poor countries—the “Lucas Paradox.” The theoretical explanations include cross-country differences in fundamentals affecting productivity, and capital market imperfections. We show that during 1970–2000, low institutional quality is the leading explanation. Improving Peru's institutional quality to Australia's level implies a quadrupling of foreign investment. Recent studies emphasize the role of institutions for achieving higher levels of income but remain silent on the specific mechanisms. Our results indicate that foreign investment might be a channel through which institutions affect long-run development.

A number of theories in organizational economics and industrial organization suggest that vertical integration, while costly, increases productivity. It follows from firms' maximizing behaviour that higher prices in the product market ought to induce more integration. Trade policy provides a source of exogenous price variation to assess this prediction: higher tariffs should lead to higher prices and, therefore, to more integration. We construct firm-level vertical integration indices for a large set of countries and industries and exploit variation in applied most-favoured-nation tariffs to examine the impact of tariffs on firm boundaries. The empirical results provide strong support for the view that higher output prices generate more vertical integration. Our estimates of the average price elasticity of vertical integration are in the range 0.4–2.

A key decision facing firms is the extent of control to exert over the different stages in their production processes. We develop and test a property rights model of firm boundary choices along the value chain. We construct firm-level measures of the upstreamness of integrated and nonintegrated inputs by combining information on firms’ production activities in more than 100 countries with input-output tables. Whether a firm integrates upstream or downstream suppliers depends crucially on the elasticity of demand it faces. Moreover, integration is shaped by the relative contractibility of stages along the value chain, as well as by the firm’s productivity.