While the percentage of mature firms with classified boards or dual class shares has declined by more than 40% since 1990, the percentage of IPO firms with these structures has doubled over this period. We test whether IPO firms implement these structures optimally or whether they are utilized to allow managers to protect their private benefits of control. Both shareholder voting patterns and changes in firm types going public suggest that the Agency Hypothesis best explains IPO firm's use of dual class, particularly when there is a large voting-cash flow wedge. In contrast, among firms with high information asymmetry, classified board structures are better explained by the Optimal Governance hypothesis.

This paper examines the effects of bond liquidity on firms’ investments. We postulate that bond liquidity increases firms’ investment opportunities by reducing the cost of capital and improving access to financing. Using the variation in liquidity generated by several – both positive and negative – exogenous shocks, we find that firms respond to positive (negative) shocks by expanding (contracting) capital expenditures and acquisition activity. Further, by enhancing access to funding, bond liquidity facilitates acquisition financing and reduces the likelihood of investment delays. We also find a positive impact of bond liquidity on market valuations and profitability, suggesting that these investments are value-increasing.