Congress pursues externalities one at a time. The resulting legislation embodies the same sequential approach, instructing regulatory agencies to set and enforce standards for a single problem. Rarely, if ever, are agencies instructed or even permitted to account for contradictions with other federal legislation and rulemaking.

Few economists are aware of a wonderful problem. While climatologists claimed it first, the twists and turns make- the problem appear almost as if it were devised to show off the tools and controversies of microeconomics. Even more astounding is the fact that such an abstract, long-term problem excites the interest of the general public and media, and even politicians who desire more resources 1O be spent on research.

The cost of government regulation of the automobile has been the subject of heated controversy since its inception in the mid- 1960's. Much of this controversy has centered on the costs and benefits of individual regulations, but there has been little attention paid to the overall effect of emissions and safety regulation. In this paper, we attempt to measure the effect of these regulatory policies upon the consumer cost of owning and operating an automobile.