Using a consumption-based asset pricing model with infinite-horizon nonlinear habit formation, Campbell and Cochrane (1999) show that low consumption in surplus of habit should forecast high expected returns. This article argues that the finite-horizon linear habit model also implies an inverse relation between expected returns and surplus consumption. This article also presents empirical evidence, which indicates that expected returns on stocks and bonds vary with surplus consumption implied by the habit models. The volatility of returns and the reward to volatility are also related to surplus consumption. However, less than 30% of the predictable variation of expected returns, using standard lagged information variables, is attributed to surplus consumption.

Using a consumption-based asset pricing model with infinite-horizon nonlinear habit formation, Campbell and Cochrane (1999) show that low consumption in surplus of habit should forecast high expected returns. This article argues that the finite-horizon linear habit model also implies an inverse relation between expected returns and surplus consumption. This article also presents empirical evidence, which indicates that expected returns on stocks and bonds vary with surplus consumption implied by the habit models. The volatility of returns and the reward to volatility are also related to surplus consumption. However, less than 30% of the predictable variation of expected returns, using standard lagged information variables, is attributed to surplus consumption. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.

This study examines the determinants and interrelationships among corporate ownership and board structure characteristics using a sample of Singapore listed firms. The institutional environment in Singapore differs from that in many developed Western economies in several important respects, including a weak market for corporate control, more concentrated stock ownership, and significant government ownership in many private sector firms. Three characteristics—board composition, board leadership structure and board size—are used to capture the monitoring ability of the board. These board characteristics are assumed to be endogenously determined, together with two ownership characteristics, managerial ownership and blockholder ownership. We use two-stage least squares regression to estimate the determinants of board and ownership characteristics. Our findings indicate that corporate ownership and board structures are related, and that there are significant interrelationships among board structure characteristics. The proportion of outside directors is negatively related to managerial ownership, board size and government ownership. The use of a dual leadership structure is positively related to blockholder ownership, and negatively related to regulation and to CEO tenure.

This paper concludes the connotation and the extension of monetary policy ,on the basis of these,research the particularity to the tools?middle-targets?conduction and the interference of China.Especially,this paper gives a demonstrable research on Chinese practice with mathematical statistics model.

A free-rider problem arises when a group choice between two alternatives has to be made on the basis of privately collected evidence, leading to insufficient effort in gathering evidence and an ex ante welfare loss for the group. To alleviate the free-rider problem, the group can commit to a "conservative" rule, whereby the decision is made against the alternative favored by the group's preference or prior when evidence supports it but is not preponderant. Optimal conservatism increases private incentives to gather evidence and improves the quality of the group decision. My result explains why sometimes groups appear overly cautious toward favored alternatives.

We assess the potential impact for non-high-income countries (NHICs) of linking bank capital asset requirements (CARs) to private sector ratings–as contemplated by the new Basel proposal. Specifically, we show that linking bank CARs to external ratings would have a series of undesirable effects for NHICs. First, since ratings are by far less widespread for banks and corporations in NHICs, bank CARs would be practically insensitive to improvements in the quality of assets, widening the gap between banks of equal financial strength located in higher and lower income countries. Second, bank and corporate ratings in NHICs (as opposed to their homologues in high-income countries) are strongly linked to their sovereign ratings. This would expose bank capital requirements in NHICs to the same “pro-cyclical” swings, which have characterized sovereign rating revision in the recent crisis episodes. We conclude that linking bank CARs to private sector ratings would worsen the availability and cost of credit to NHICs – with potential negative effects on the level of economic activity – and suggest that a reassessment of the Basel proposal may help to avoid such undesired consequences.

Committees improve decisions by pooling members' independent information, but promote manipulation, obfuscation, and exaggeration of private information when members have conflicting preferences. Committee decision procedures transform continuous data into ordered ranks through voting. This coarsens the transmission of information, but controls strategic manipulations and allows some degree of information sharing. Each member becomes more cautious in casting the crucial vote than when he alone makes the decision based on own information. Increased quality of one member's information results in his casting the crucial vote more often. Committees make better decisions for members than does delegation.