The 2023 banking turmoil highlighted how technological advancements have significantly accelerated the speed of bank runs. This paper investigates the impact of these faster bank runs on the effectiveness of policy interventions by interpreting them as a constraint on the relative speed of policy responses. Using a model of bank runs and ex-post policy responses, we examine how delays caused by this constraint affect financial fragility and welfare. We find that while delays exacerbate welfare loss by distorting allocations, they may also decrease fragility by making banks more cautious. We study the optimal level of structural delay, balancing the trade-off between distributional distortions and financial fragility. Furthermore, we extend this model to explore the roles of liquidity regulations and capital injections given such a delay. We show that regulation may be more desirable than a capital injection if the delay is substantial because the benefit of decreased fragility is particularly potent.

This paper studies the grouping of firms based on their labor-market connections, a significant departure from the traditional approach of grouping based on product-market connections. It also proposes a measure of labor market peers by analyzing the “also viewed” companies on two major online labor market platforms, LinkedIn and Glassdoor. Using the labor market peer measure, I examine whether firms that hire employees with similar skills and that are presumably exposed to the same labor-related risks and shocks exhibit a strong comovement of stock returns and accounting-based performance variables. I find that labor market peers overlap but differ from traditional product-market-based industry groupings, have significant incremental power to explain stock return and accounting-based performance measure comovements, and outperform traditional industry groupings in explaining return and wage comovements when a base firm shares more labor skills with its peers. Overall, the study highlights that labor market peers capture fundamental linkages between firms that are challenging to identify using traditional industry measures.

A salient trend in crisis intervention has emerged in recent decades: government and central banks have offered funding directly to nonfinancial firms, bypassing banks and other credit intermediaries. We analyse the long-term consequences of such policies by focussing on firm quality dynamics. In a laissez-faire economy, firms with high productivity are more likely to survive crises than those with low productivity. The government funding support saves more firms but cannot be customized based on firm productivity, dampening the cleansing effect of crises. The policy distortion is self-perpetuating: a downward bias in the firm quality distribution necessitates larger interventions in future crises. Our mechanism is quantitatively important: we show that if policymakers ignore such distortionary effects on firm quality dynamics, the resultant credit intervention would almost double the optimal amount.

We examine the impact of the global trend towards trade protectionism on household stock market participation, focusing on the 2018–19 US-China trade war as an exogenous trade shock. We leverage cross-city variation in exposure to the trade war by combining industry-specific increases in US tariffs with variation in industry composition across cities. Using nationally representative household finance survey data collected around the trade war years, and a difference-in-differences design, results show that the onset of the trade war decreases the likelihood of households participating in the stock market and reduces the proportion of stocks in their portfolios. Further evidence reveals that these effects stem from the trade war's influence on decreasing household income, increasing income volatility, fostering risk aversion, and promoting negative views or beliefs about the economy. Our findings suggest that reduced stock market participation is a pathway through which trade protectionism affects the financial system and the economy.

We estimate investors’ disagreement regarding firm news and assess its ability to predict stock returns. Specifically, we quantify firm-level investor disagreement through the volume-volatility elasticity surrounding firm news; higher elasticity is associated with less investor disagreement. Intuitively, disagreement introduces additional trading motives that are not driven by price changes, weakening the connection between volume and volatility. Our findings indicate that investor disagreement on news negatively predicts cross-sectional returns. We also present empirical evidence aligned with the theoretical predictions of a recently developed model by Atmaz and Basak (Journal of Finance 73 (3): 1225–1279 2018) that the negative disagreement-stock relation strengthens when the optimism effect dominates the uncertainty effect. Importantly, this predictive relationship remains robust after controlling for news heterogeneity, other volume- and volatility-based measures, and alternative channels.

This paper explores the impact of executive compensation structure on firm debt choices. To analyze the relationship between executive compensation and firm debt structure via the managerial effort channel, we extend the theoretical model developed by Boot et al. (1991) by incorporating an agent-principal model. We employ data from US Equity Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) to empirically assess the model's implications. The evidence presented in this study reveals that when executive compensation exhibits a higher sensitivity to the firm's stock price (represented by a higher Delta), the firm tends to use a greater proportion of secured debt within its overall debt structure. This phenomenon can be attributed to the managerial effort channel: firms with higher Delta values tend to engage in investments that are more effort-sensitive, and these investment choices are positively associated with increased utilization of secured debt, where the collateral plays the role of incentivizing the manager to put more effort into projects – an “effort-lifting” behavior. These findings hold for an expanded sample consisting of firms from all industries. Our analysis offers a fresh perspective on the use of collateral and executive compensation as a tool to mitigate principal-agent problems.

The transition toward an intangible-intensive economy reshapes financial systems by creating a self-perpetuating savings glut in the production sector. As intangibles become increasingly important, firms hoard liquidity to finance investment in intangibles of limited pledgeability. Firms’ savings feed cheap leverage to financial intermediaries and allow intermediaries to bid up asset prices, which in turn encourages firms to save more for asset creation. This paper develops a macrofinance model that offers a coherent account of rising corporate savings, debt-fueled growth of intermediaries, declining interest rates, and rising asset valuation. Along these secular trends, endogenous financial risk accumulates.

How important is equal access to mandatory disclosures? We exploit the postal strike of 1970 that caused a delay in the delivery of annual reports via mail. This strike created unequal access because certain investors (e.g., institutions) had both the incentives and ability to obtain the annual reports by other means. Theory predicts that, when differential access exists, adverse selection problems intensify, causing a decline in stock trading. Our findings support this prediction: stock trading volume decreased by approximately 28% for firms unable to deliver the annual reports to shareholders during the strike, and this trading decline gradually dissipated afterward. Further tests confirm adverse selection as the primary mechanism. Overall, our paper underscores the importance of equal access to annual reports—a key mandated disclosure—and demonstrates the value of these reports to shareholders, as evidenced by their reluctance to trade absent this information.

We demonstrate that a persistent pattern exists in the evolution of the MTB ratio from 1999 to 2023, wherein firms with high (low) MTB ratios tend to maintain those levels over time. The persistence of the MTB ratio is independent of industry effects and cannot be well explained by accounting performance. Intangible investment plays a crucial role in determining the MTB ratio, and its persistence is primarily maintained through continued internal intangible investment rather than external mergers and acquisitions. Moreover, although U.S. firms have increased their investment in intangible assets over the past 25 years, the gap between high- and low-MTB firms in intangible investment has widened. Our results suggest that the basis of stock value has shifted from tangible to intangible investments over time.