This study examines changes in SEC enforcement and firm cooperation after the SEC introduced its new cooperation program in 2010. While previous research shows that the SEC penalized cooperative firms prior to 2010, our results suggest that after that year, it rewarded cooperation, especially good faith actions. We also find that after 2010, the SEC increased mentions of cooperation in public speeches and publicized more details about firm cooperative activities in AAERs. Finally, we find some evidence that misconduct firms increased good faith cooperation after the SEC revised its cooperation program in 2010. Our findings suggest that having a more explicit leniency program improves its effectiveness.

After fitting a topic model to 40,927 COVID-19–related paragraphs in 3,581 earnings calls over the period Jan. 22–Apr. 30, 2020, we obtain firm-level measures of exposure and response related to COVID-19 for 2,894 U.S. firms. We show that despite the large negative impact of COVID-19 on their operations, firms with a strong corporate culture outperform their peers without a strong culture. Moreover, these firms are more likely to support their community, embrace digital transformation, and develop new products than those peers. We conclude that corporate culture is an intangible asset designed to meet unforeseen contingencies as they arise.

We exploit the staggered introduction of the PCAOB's international inspection program to examine the role that the stringency of public audit oversight plays in shaping US institutional investors' home bias. Analyzing a sample of foreign firms listed in the United States, we evaluate whether US institutional investors hold larger equity stakes in these firms—a longstanding issue that reflects investor portfolio decisions—if their auditors are exposed to the threat of a PCAOB inspection. In a differences‐in‐differences framework, we find that US‐listed foreign firms enjoy an increase in US institutional investors' equity positions after their auditors become subject to PCAOB inspection access. Cross‐sectional analysis implies that the benefit of the PCAOB inspection threat in mitigating US institutional investors' home bias is concentrated in foreign countries without a strict local audit oversight system; active US institutional investors that are known to value accounting transparency; and firms from countries that grant PCAOB access later (after the onset of its international inspection program in 2005). Our evidence suggests that foreign firms become better known in the capital markets under the PCAOB inspection program, which induces US institutional investors to acquire larger equity stakes in US‐listed foreign firms given the lower information asymmetry that ensues under the PCAOB inspection threat.

We examine whether the strength of internal control over financial reporting (internal control) reduces the expropriation of resources from the firm by managers and controlling shareholders. Although we have ample evidence from prior literature that internal controls reduce errors in financial reports, it is less clear that they can curb resource extraction, because management may fail to enforce these controls. Exploiting the setting of China, where we have a rich internal control data set and established measures of resource extraction, we provide evidence consistent with internal controls curbing resource extraction on average. In particular, we document a negative association between internal control strength and resource extraction. We also find that the association between internal control strength and resource extraction is weaker in settings where we expect management to have fewer incentives to enforce these controls: within state‐owned firms and within non‐state‐owned firms that have a powerful controlling shareholder. We interpret these results as suggesting that internal controls must both exist and be enforced by management for the controls to safeguard assets. Although the analyses are conducted using Chinese data, we expect the spirit of our findings to generalize to other settings—management can “window dress” internal control procedures while still engaging in undesirable behavior.

We examine whether dividend tax induced lock-in reduces idiosyncratic volatility. The 2012 Dividend Tax Reform in China tied individual investors' dividend tax to the length of their shareholding period, with short-term individual investors entering into higher tax brackets. We find that high dividend firms experience a reduction in idiosyncratic volatility, relative to low dividend firms, after the reform. The effect is more pronounced when high dividend firms have more retail investors and exhibit greater uncertainty. High dividend firms also experience a reduction in stock price crashes. Finally, with reduced trading by individual investors who are likely less informed, earnings announcements of high dividend firms trigger less trading volume during the event window post-reform, but enable more complete price reactions. We conclude that dividend tax induced lock-in, through discouraging short-term individual investors' trading, stabilizes the market and improves share price informativeness.

Using administrative tax records for U.K. businesses, we document both bunching in annual turnover below the VAT registration threshold and persistent voluntary registration by almost half of the firms below the threshold. We develop a conceptual framework that can simultaneously explain these two apparently conflicting facts. The framework also predicts that higher intermediate input shares, lower product-market competition, and a lower share of business to consumer sales lead to voluntary registration. The predictions are exactly the opposite for bunching. We test the theory using linked VAT and corporation tax records from 2004 to 2014, finding empirical support for these predictions.