The rise of passive institutional investors in the U.S. stock market raises questions about the governance implications to their portfolio firms. While the existing literature documents positive governance changes when passive institutional ownership displaces retail ownership, it remains unclear how passive institutional ownership approaches corporate governance differently than their active peers. This paper compares the proxy voting behaviors between same-family passive and active mutual funds with identical investment styles. We find that passive funds are not more likely to vote in favor of governance reforms than active funds. We also provide suggestive evidence that besides voting, the influence of passive funds on corporate governance also operates through a “behind the scenes” channel.

We examine 1984–2018 data and show that the talent or ability of sell-side financial analysts affects a covered firm's information environment—more so than the simple number of analysts covering a firm. We find that while analysts in general produce market and industry-level information, high-ability analysts contribute more firm-specific information. Firms covered by high-ability analysts experience significantly less insider trading prior to positive earnings news. Results only reside in opportunistic (not routine) trades. When an analyst initiates (terminates) coverage we find decreased (increased) subsequent insider trading. Both changes are primarily driven by analyst talent. Analyst ability also negatively relates to insider trading profitability.

This study explores the relationship between executive compensation and the preference dynamics of managers and shareholders. Our analysis centers on the theoretical prediction that changes in firms' asset value can differentially affect the risk-taking preferences of the two groups, potentially influencing the optimal compensation policy. Utilizing local real estate price changes to identify variations in firms’ asset value, we find that a decrease in asset value leads to more risk-taking incentives in compensation, and this effect is more pronounced in firms that are more likely to be influenced by the hypothesized mechanisms. In the second empirical setting, we provide corroborating evidence using a natural experiment involving disaster-induced negative shocks to the firm fundamentals. Collectively, our findings suggest that the design of compensation contracts facilitates incentive alignment by incorporating the dynamic preferences of the contracting parties.

We identify a parsimonious set of factors from a large pool of candidates for explaining hedge fund returns, ranging from equity market, anomaly, and trend-following factors to macroeconomic factors. The resulting 9-factor model, including five anomaly factors, outperforms existing hedge fund models both in sample and out of sample, with a significant reduction in alphas while showing substantial cross sectional performance heterogeneity. Further analysis based on fund holdings confirms the model’s ability to capture returns from arbitrage trading. Overall, the anomaly factors help quantify hedge fund strategies and risk exposures and improve fund performance evaluation.