We use the 2015 Chinese stock market crash to study the effects of government stock purchases. The Chinese government purchased stocks to stabilize the markets through state-owned financial institutions known as the “National Team.” We find that the intervention led to reduced volatility and price informativeness. These impacts are driven by the disclosure of government portfolios. Consistent with investors having a stronger incentive to acquire government intervention information instead of fundamental news, we find reduced information production and information asymmetry following intervention disclosure. The article suggests that government stock purchases involve a trade-off between stability and informational efficiency.

We propose an Optimal candlesticK (OK) estimator for the spot volatility using high-frequency candlestick observations. Under a standard infill asymptotic setting, we show that the OK estimator is asymptotically unbiased and has minimal asymptotic variance within a class of linear estimators. Its estimation error can be coupled by a Brownian functional, which permits valid inference. Our theoretical and numerical results suggest that the proposed candlestick-based estimator is much more accurate than the conventional spot volatility estimator based on high-frequency returns. An empirical illustration documents the intraday volatility dynamics of various assets during the Fed chairman’s recent congressional testimony.

We examine the significance and uniqueness of individual-pair relationships cultivated through repeated loan interactions. Using a hand-collected dataset compiled of borrowing manager and loan officer information, we find that individual-pair relationship loans are associated with a cost-of-debt reduction of between seven to 13 basis points. We also document that the relationship has an economic impact even when other affiliations, for example, institutional pairs, social ties, cultural proximity, and gender, are considered. Individual-pair relationships matter because they furnish lenders with useful soft information, especially when the firm has a poor hard information environment or when the bank and loan officer rely less on hard information. In addition, we find that individual-pair relationship loans have fewer rating downgrades, suggesting that accumulated soft information leads to better loan quality. Collectively, our results highlight the unique value of sustained professional engagement between two individuals in the lending process.

In common-law systems, firms’ litigation risk depends both on written laws and how courts interpret these laws. Using 321 US circuit court rulings, we introduce a novel measure capturing courts’ attitudes toward defendants in securities lawsuits. Our results confirm that financial misreporting firms in more defendant-friendly circuits face fewer lawsuits. Consistent with lower expected litigation costs, firms in these circuits face less negative market reactions when misreporting is revealed, invest less in preventing misreporting, and are more likely to engage in aggressive misreporting. We conclude that defendant-friendly precedents reduce firms’ legal liability and worsen their financial reporting quality.