This paper extends Brock and Durlauf's (2001a, 2001b) binary choice complete network (or group interaction) model with homogeneous rational expectations to a general network model with heterogeneous rational expectations. In our model, individuals will form expectations regarding peers' behaviors taking into account their characteristics. Endogenous, contextual, and correlated effects are all identifiable. Conditions for unique equilibrium are established. For a complete network with heterogeneous rational expectations, multiple equilibria can be characterized by an aggregate scalar index. The empirical results on adolescents' smoking behaviors show significant endogenous and contextual effects, even after controlling for school-grade random effects and school fixed effects.

We examine shareholder litigation and the price and nonprice terms of bank loan contracts. After filing a lawsuit, defendant firms pay higher loan spreads and up-front charges, experience more financial covenants, and are more likely to have a collateral requirement. These findings are consistent with reputational losses associated with shareholder litigation. The magnitude of a firm’s lost market value when the lawsuit is filed is positively related to the increase in the firm’s future borrowing costs. We investigate whether the lawsuit allegations and its merit affect future bank loan terms. Our results do not appear to be affected by self-selection.