This paper investigates the role of corporate financial reports in the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) regulatory activities. By tracking the EPA's direct retrieval of SEC filings, we identify three key findings. First, the EPA retrieves a large volume of financial reports, especially from firms in high‐pollution industries. Second, the EPA is more likely to access financial reports during enforcement investigations and significant rule proposals, but less so during compliance monitoring, with patterns varying predictably across firms. Third, the EPA's reliance on financial reports is potentially driven by its demand for information on firm liquidity, solvency, and profitability. Overall, our study highlights the usefulness of financial reports for the EPA as an environmental regulator.

We study the quantitative impact of lender control rights on corporate investment, asset prices, and the aggregate economy. We build a general equilibrium model in which the breaching of a loan covenant (technical default) entails a switch in investment control rights from borrowers to lenders. Lenders optimally choose low-risk projects, thus mitigating borrowers’ risk-taking incentives and lowering the cost of equity. This mechanism generates strong macroeconomic effects and mitigates the financial accelerator. Consistent with our model, proximity to technical default in the data is associated with 4.12% lower returns and lower exposure to systematic risk.

In recent years, firms have increasingly come under scrutiny from environmental, social, and governance (ESG) rating agencies which systematically assess and publicize ESG-related information to diverse stakeholders. This study aims to investigate whether firms exhibit a heightened incentive to avoid ESG-related regulatory violations once they come under the coverage of ESG rating agencies. Analyzing data spanning from 2000 to 2018 and considering the coverage provided by four prominent ESG rating agencies to U.S. firms, we leverage the staggered initiation and intensity of this coverage. Our findings reveal a negative correlation between ESG violations and the commencement and extent of coverage by ESG rating agencies. This relationship is particularly pronounced for firms characterized by lower levels of corporate monitoring as indicated by fewer analysts providing coverage, limited media attention, weaker ESG commitments, and less disparate ESG ratings. Taken together, our study sheds light on the monitoring role of ESG rating agencies, illustrating their significance in incentivizing managers to mitigate ESG violations.