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The Effect of Ex Ante Management Forecast Accuracy on the Post-Earnings-Announcement Drift

The Accounting Review 2012 87(5), 1791-1818
I examine the effect of ex ante management forecast accuracy on the post-earnings-announcement drift when management forecasts about next quarter's earnings are bundled with current quarter's earnings announcements. I build a composite measure of ex ante management forecast accuracy that takes into account forecast ability, forecast difficulty, and forecast environment. The results show that the bundled forecasts with higher ex ante accuracy mitigate investors' under-reaction to current earnings and reduce the magnitude of the post-earnings-announcement drift. Data Availability: The data used in this paper are available from the sources listed in the text.

Director gender and mergers and acquisitions

Journal of Corporate Finance 2014 28, 185-200
Does director gender influence CEO empire building? Does it affect the bid premium paid for target firms? Less overconfident female directors less overestimate merger gains. As a result, firms with female directors are less likely to make acquisitions and if they do, pay lower bid premia. Using acquisition bids by S&P 1500 companies during 1997–2009 we find that each additional female director is associated with 7.6% fewer bids, and each additional female director on a bidder board reduces the bid premium paid by 15.4%. Our findings support the notion that female directors help create shareholder value through their influence on acquisition decisions. We also discuss other possible interpretations of our findings.

Another game in town: Spillover effects of IPOs in China

Journal of Corporate Finance 2021 67, 101910
We investigate the stock price reactions of industry competitors to IPOs in China. Contrary to findings in the U.S., we document a positive valuation effect of Chinese IPOs from 2002 to 2013. This finding is robust to alternative rival definitions, investor reaction measurement, and sample selection criteria. Based on the existing theories and institutional setup of the Chinese stock market, we propose three non-competing hypotheses: the signaling hypothesis (i.e., IPOs could convey positive industry-related information), the collusion hypothesis (i.e., rival firms can benefit from the increasing likelihood of collusion), and the substitution hypothesis (i.e., rival stocks can substitute for IPO stocks as an appealing investment). With a series of tests, we demonstrate that the substitution hypothesis can explain this phenomenon. Furthermore, we find that the spillover effects of IPOs decline with the increase in investment choices after 2014.

Short Selling Pressure, Stock Price Behavior, and Management Forecast Precision: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Journal of Accounting Research 2015 53(1), 79-117
Using a natural experiment (Regulation SHO), we show that short selling pressure and consequent stock price behavior have a causal effect on managers’ voluntary disclosure choices. Specifically, we find that managers respond to a positive exogenous shock to short selling pressure and price sensitivity to bad news by reducing the precision of bad news forecasts. This finding on management forecasts appears to be generalizable to other corporate disclosures. In particular, we find that, in response to increased short selling pressure, managers also reduce the readability (or increase the fuzziness) of bad news annual reports. Overall, our results suggest that maintaining the current level of stock prices is an important consideration in managers’ strategic disclosure decisions.

Production Externalities, Congruity of Aggregate Signals, and Optimal Task Assignments*

Contemporary Accounting Research 2005 22(2), 393-408
In this paper, we consider the role of production externalities in the task assignment problem. Milgrom and Roberts (1992) suggest that complementarities available when agents are assigned to diverse tasks are necessary to overcome distortions in effort allocations caused by an inability to fine‐tune incentives when agents' compensation is based on aggregate imperfect signals. Our analysis formalizes this intuition in a setting that encompasses externalities under both diverse and similar task assignments.

Why Are Derivative Warrants More Expensive Than Options? An Empirical Study

Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 2011 46(1), 275-297
Derivative warrants typically have higher prices than do otherwise identical options. Using data from the Hong Kong market during 2002–2007, we show that the price difference reflects the liquidity premium of derivative warrants over options. Newly issued derivative warrants are much more liquid than options with similar terms. As a result, long-term derivative warrants are preferred by traders who trade frequently. In spite of their higher prices, short-term returns on long-term derivative warrants are, in fact, higher than the hypothetical short-term returns on options. The differences in price and liquidity measures decline as the contracts get closer to maturity.