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How labor market competition shapes workplace information on social media: evidence from Glassdoor reviews

Review of Accounting Studies 2026 open access
We examine how labor market competition affects the quality of workplace information on social media. Using employer reviews on Glassdoor for U.S. publicly listed firms from 2011 to 2022, we find that reviews become less informative about actual workplace practices when firms face more intense competition for labor, consistent with competition inducing workplace information management. The decline in review informativeness is more pronounced when employees have narrower external networks, when firms are less unionized, and when firms have a smaller review base, suggesting that workplace information management is more likely when labor market information asymmetry is greater. Additional analyses show that positive reviews in highly competitive labor markets predict higher short-term labor inflows but greater subsequent employee turnover, indicating a gap between managed expectations and actual workplace conditions. Taken together, our evidence suggests that labor market competition potentially distorts the crowdsourced signals available to job seekers on anonymous review websites.

Freedom of Expression Protection and Corporate Concealment of Bad News: Evidence from State Anti‐SLAPP Laws

Journal of Accounting Research 2026 64(1), 365-415 open access
The protection of free speech enhances the ability of various public stakeholders to disseminate privately observed adverse information about public firms, making it difficult for corporate managers to conceal negative information about their companies. Using the staggered enactment of anti‐strategic lawsuit against public participation (anti‐SLAPP) laws across U.S. states as a shock that strengthens free speech protection, we show that stronger protection is associated with less concealment of bad news. This is evidenced by a lower likelihood of stock price crashes, a decreased probability of accounting fraud, and an increased frequency of firm‐initiated negative press releases. These results are more pronounced for states with stronger anti‐SLAPP laws and where such laws are likely to be more influential. Moreover, the impact of free speech protection on bad news concealment is more significant for firms with greater ex ante incentives to conceal negative information. Further analyses suggest that free speech protection likely enhances the ability of short sellers, employees, and the media, among others, to reveal bad news about public firms. Finally, we find evidence that strengthened free speech protection also improves financial reporting quality. Our study highlights the importance of free speech protection in enhancing corporate transparency.