We examine the risk characteristics and capital adequacy of hedge funds through the Value-at-Risk approach. Using extensive data on nearly 1,500 hedge funds, we find only 3.7% live and 10.9% dead funds are undercapitalized as of March 2003. Moreover, the undercapitalized funds are relatively small and constitute a tiny fraction of total fund assets in our sample. Cross-sectionally, the variability in fund capitalization is related to size, investment style, age, and management fee. Hedge fund risk and capitalization also display significant time variation. Traditional risk measures like standard deviation or leverage ratios fail to detect these trends.

We consider partnerships among risk-averse professionals endowed with (i) a risky and personally-costly production technology and (ii) a personally-costly monitoring technology providing contractible noisy signals about partners’ productive efforts. Partners shirk both production and monitoring tasks because efforts are unobservable. We characterize optimal partnership size, profit shares and incentive payments when every partner performs the same tasks, and show that medium-sized partnerships are dominated by either smaller or larger partnerships. Prohibiting some partners from monitoring increases the incentives for others to monitor. We illustrate how task assignments and incentives interact, leading to improvements in partner welfare.