This paper investigates whether a firm's debt maturity structure affects the quality of its risk disclosures. Using a sample of U.S. public firms from 2005 to 2017, we provide robust evidence that a firm's exposure to refinancing risk, measured as the proportion of long-term debt that matures within one year, is positively correlated with the readability and specificity of risk disclosures. This relationship is stronger for firms that have greater concerns over refinancing risk and for firms operating in environments with lower proprietary disclosure costs. In addition, we show that high-quality risk disclosures can help firms mitigate refinancing risk by reducing the cost of future debt financing. Our study extends the current literature on risk disclosures and enhances the understanding of how refinancing risk shapes corporate disclosures.

This paper investigates whether banks value the presence of prosocial CEOs when designing loan contracts. Using personal charitable donation behavior to identify prosocial CEOs, we find robust evidence that the presence of prosocial CEOs is negatively related to firms' cost of debt. We address endogeneity concerns by employing a difference-in-differences setting that exploits exogenous CEO turnover events. Moreover, we show that the presence of prosocial CEOs mitigates the conflicts of interest between shareholders and creditors, thereby reduces the agency cost of debt. In addition, we find that the effect of prosocial CEOs also extends to non-price loan contract terms. Finally, we show that the presence of prosocial CEOs has positive implications for firm value and is associated with lower default risk.

This paper examines the role of restrictive covenants in convertible bonds. After controlling for standard covenant intensity determinants, an average convertible bond offering has 3.21 fewer covenants than an average straight bond offering. While covenants negatively affect straight bond yields, there is no negative association between covenants and convertible bond yields. Moreover, contrary to straight bond covenants, convertible bond covenants are set largely independently of issuer characteristics. Overall, our findings suggest that the conversion option and certain covenants are substitutes for addressing debt-related financing costs. The few covenants included in convertibles represent irrelevant boilerplate clauses.