In this paper, we investigate whether listed firms in China adjust their capital structure in response to an increase in the corporate tax rate. Although theories of capital structure suggest that corporate tax is an important determinant of capital structure, how exogenous changes of the tax rate affect firms’ leverage decisions has not been fully explored. We examine a unique circumstance in which the Chinese government increased the corporate tax rate of firms that had previously received local government tax rebates. The evidence indicates that these firms increased their leverage when the corporate tax rate increased. Further investigation suggests that the adjustment of leverage was mostly driven by firms with a high level of access to bank loans.

This paper investigates the empirical relationship between firm-level investment and the stock market in China from a price informativeness perspective. We find that firm investment does not significantly respond to the stock market valuation, because stock prices contain very little extra information about the future operating performance of firms. This finding is further supported by the relative investment response test and the relative price information content test based on the informativeness proxy of price non-synchronicity combined with firm information transparency.

Although audit regulators worldwide concur that the rigor of audit firms’ internal engagement quality reviews (EQRs) is paramount to an audit firm’s audit quality, they are concerned that relationships between audit engagement partner (AEP) and engagement review partner (ERP) working in the same firm can undermine these reviews. We utilize confidential proprietary ERP and audit adjustment data to investigate how school alma mater ties between AEPs and ERPs affect audit adjustments in China. Our results reveal that audit adjustments are significantly lower when an AEP and ERP share school ties. This effect is more pronounced when the ERP is less competent than and lacks authority over the AEP, when the ERP and AEP perform mutual reviews or previously coaudited a client, and when the AEP’s work is flawed. Finally, semistructured partner interviews corroborate our empirical findings and strengthen our practical and policy implications. Data Availability: These proprietary data were provided to us with the understanding that it would be used only for independent academic research. Our research team is obligated under nondisclosure and confidentiality conditions to not disclose or share the confidential information which includes all of the data received from the data providers of the Chinese government and not to report information in any article or presentation that would inadvertently reveal (including any potential link) the identity of the partners, firms, their characteristics, and the audit adjustment data. No other restrictions were imposed by the data providers regarding the use of the data purely for academic research purposes and in communicating the research findings. Other data not subject to this confidentiality nondisclosure are available from sources identified in the text.

We examine efficiency improvement associated with audit firm mergers. Our analysis is made possible by a unique dataset of audit hours in China. We find a significant reduction in audit hours, unaccompanied by a deterioration in audit quality, of merged audit firms. Further, we find a larger reduction in audit hours when acquirers are Chinese domestic Big 10 audit firms and when client firms are more complex. These results are consistent with the notion of economies of scale arising from horizontal mergers. However, enhanced efficiency does not necessarily reduce audit fees. Instead, we find an increase in audit fees when acquirers are international Big 4 audit firms even when we control for possible changes in market power. This premium is at least partially due to the certification effect of international Big 4 audit firms.