This paper examines how the reporting model for a firm's operating assets affects analyst forecast accuracy. We contrast U.K. and U.S. investment property firms having real estate as their primary operating asset, exploiting that U.K. (U.S.) firms report these assets at fair value (historical cost). We assess the accuracy of a balance-sheet-based forecast (net asset value, or NAV) and an income-statement-based forecast (earnings per share, or EPS). We predict and find higher NAV forecast accuracy for U.K. relative to U.S. firms, consistent with the fair value reporting model revealing private information that is incorporated into analysts' balance sheet forecasts. We find this difference is attenuated when the fair value and historical cost models are more likely to converge: during recessionary periods. Finally, we predict and find lower EPS forecast accuracy for U.K. firms when reporting under the full fair value model of IFRS, in which unrealized fair value gains and losses are included in net income. This is consistent with the full fair value model increasing the difficulty of forecasting net income through the inclusion of non-serially correlated elements such as these gains/losses. Information content analyses provide further support for these inferences. Overall, the results indicate that the fair value reporting model enhances analysts' ability to forecast the balance sheet, but the full fair value model reduces their ability to forecast net income.

This study investigates how external corporate governance provisions, specifically statutory and corporate charter provisions that limit direct shareholder participation in the governance process, affect the likelihood of an accounting restatement. The analysis indicates that strong external governance (fewer restrictions on shareholder participation) is associated with a relatively low incidence of accounting restatements. The effect of external governance is incremental to that of internal governance, which is considered as provisions that foster effective board oversight of management. Such evidence supports the premise that shareholder participation improves financial reporting quality.