ABSTRACT This paper focuses on contractual distinctions as an explanation for the price divergence between futures and forward contracts. Specifically, it investigates the effect of marking‐to‐market on the observed price differences using the pricing model described in Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (CIR) (1981, Journal of Financial Economics 9 , 321–346). Using previously unavailable data, this paper employs Eurodollars, an interest rate‐sensitive financial asset, to test the CIR model. Unlike prior empirical studies, test results support both the weak prediction concerning the sign of the average price difference and the stronger prediction that specific covariances explain the variation in the price differences.

This paper focuses on contractual distinctions as an explanation for the price divergence between futures and forward contracts. Specifically, it investigates the effect of marking-to-market on the observed price differences using the pricing model described in Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross (1981). Using previously unavailable data, this paper employs Eurodollars, an interest rate-sensitive financial asset, to test the Cox, Ingersoll, and Ross model. Unlike prior empirical studies, test results support both the weak prediction concerning the sign of the average price difference and the stronger prediction that specific covariances explain the variation in the price differences.

Whether insider trading affects stock prices is central to both the current debate over whether insider trading is harmful or pervasive, and to the broader public policy issue of how best to regulate securities markets. Using previously unexplored data on illegal insider trading from the Securities and Exchange Commission, this paper finds that the stock market detects the possibility of informed trading and impounds this information into the stock price. Specifically, the abnormal return on an insider trading day averages 3%, and almost half of the pre-announcement stock price run-up observed before takeovers occurs on insider trading days. Both the amount traded by the insider and additional trade-specific characteristics lead to the market's recognition of the informed trading.

Whether insider trading affects stock prices is central to both the current debate over whether insider trading is harmful or pervasive, and to the broader public policy issue of how best to regulate securities markets. Using previously unexplored data on illegal insider trading from the Securities and Exchange Commission, this paper finds that the stock market detects the possibility of informed trading and impounds this information into the stock price. Specifically, the abnormal return on an insider trading day averages 3 percent, and almost half of the pre-announcement stock price run-up observed before takeovers occurs on insider trading days. Both the amount traded by the insider and additional trade-specific characteristics lead to the market's recognition of the informed trading.

ABSTRACT Whether insider trading affects stock prices is central to both the current debate over whether insider trading is harmful or pervasive, and to the broader public policy issue of how best to regulate securities markets. Using previously unexplored data on illegal insider trading from the Securities and Exchange Commission, this paper finds that the stock market detects the possibility of informed trading and impounds this information into the stock price. Specifically, the abnormal return on an insider trading day averages 3%, and almost half of the pre‐announcement stock price run‐up observed before takeovers occurs on insider trading days. Both the amount traded by the insider and additional trade‐specific characteristics lead to the market's recognition of the informed trading.

Abstract This paper empirically investigates whether illegal insider trading increases the premium a bidder pays for a target. Illegal insider trading is trading by traditional corporate insiders, as well as others in a position of trust and confidence (e.g. investment bankers, lawyers), based on material, non-public information (‘inside information’). The paper examines the premia of takeovers with known illegal insider trading and compares them to a control sample of takeovers matched by industry, time period, and size that do not have detected illegal insider trading. After controlling for differences in merger characteristics, such as number of bidders, type of offer, form of payment, etc., we find that takeovers with detected illegal insider trading have takeover premia which are approximately 10 percentage points, or almost one-third, higher than the control sample. We conduct additional tests in an attempt to determine the direction of causality between illegal insider trading and takeover premia size and explore the effect of potential detection bias. The results suggest both that illegal inside traders base their trades on factors other than premia size, and that illegal insider trading in takeovers with large premia is not necessarily more likely to be detected. Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the illegal insider trading itself tends to create larger takeover premia.