This study examines the relationship between board gender diversity and corporate environmental violations. Drawing on gender socialization and diversity theories, greater female board representation and female chief executive officers (CEO) are expected to reduce the frequency of corporate environmental violations. Empirical evidence in this study shows that firms with greater board gender diversity are less often sued for environmental infringements. In contrast, CEO gender is linked to reduced environmental litigation only in firms with low female board representation. I explore the relationship between board gender diversity and improved corporate environmental policies as a mechanism to explain the reduced litigation frequency. The findings are robust to controlling for reverse causality, propensity score matching, subsample analyses, different variable definitions, alternative model specifications, and industry controls and adjustments. These findings provide important insights to investors, managers, and policymakers into the role of female leadership in public companies.

We study a random sample of completed and withdrawn takeovers during the 1981 to 2014 time period to provide new evidence on the role of takeover impediments such as poison pills, staggered boards and state antitakeover devices. Do such impediments act in the interest of management by promoting entrenchment or do they act in shareholder interest by improving bargaining power during the takeover auction process? We first confirm the growing trend of takeover impediments over time in our sample. We then relate these trends to changes in the takeover auction process over time. Although we corroborate prior findings of a decline in hostile takeovers and publicly reported takeover auctions between the 1980s and later time periods, we find that takeover competition across the entire auction process between deal initiation and completion has not declined. In effect, takeover competition via auctions has gone underground. Moreover, takeover premiums have not declined over time. We interpret the results to be consistent with the shareholder interest/bargaining power hypothesis and inconsistent with the management interest/entrenchment hypothesis. Our analysis highlights the usefulness of research sources for SEC merger documents including microfiche, Lexis Nexis and Thomson One Financial that provide historical information on the takeover auction process prior to the EDGAR filings that started in the mid-1990s.

We find a robust negative relation between skewness/lottery-like features, proxied by maximum return (MAX) over the last month, and future returns for stocks preferred by individual investors. This negative relation is nonexistent for the rest of stocks. We identify stocks preferred by individual investors through bundling ten stock characteristics associated with their stock preferences. The negative relation between MAX and future return is produced by the stocks preferred by individuals that account for less than 5% of the overall market capitalization. Our results are robust to alternative definitions of MAX and lottery-like features such as total, idiosyncratic, and expected skewness.

This paper documents the history of aggregate positions in US index options and investigates the driving factors behind use of this class of derivatives. We construct several measures of the magnitude of the market and characterize their level, trend, and covariates. Measured in terms of volatility exposure, the market is economically small, but it embeds a significant latent exposure to large price changes. Out-of-the-money puts are the dominant component of open positions. Variation in options use is well described by a stochastic trend driven by equity market activity and a significant negative response to increases in risk. Using a rich collection of uncertainty proxies, we distinguish distinct responses to exogenous macroeconomic risk, risk aversion, differences of opinion, and disaster risk. The results are consistent with the view that the primary function of index options is the transfer of unspanned crash risk.

We propose a contingent clawback bond (COCLA) as an alternative source of contingent convertible capital (CoCo). We develop a utility maximization model in which a bank manager faces the following two trade-offs: one trade-off is between the private benefits of control and costs of financial distress when loans under-perform, and the other is between the costs and benefits of screening loan credit quality (effort). In our model, the supply of loans, amount of junior debt issued, level of effort exerted by a manager, and manager's decision to exercise the clawback option are endogenously determined in the maximization of the manager's utility function. We find that the manager optimally exercises the clawback following a low realization of cash flows, thereby solving the trigger problem presented in CoCos. In the model, the debt to equity conversion from the COCLA is an endogenous decision, the regulatory capital adequacy ratio (CAR) is satisfied, and the bank does not face distress costs. From a practical perspective, the conversion rate for the COCLA that jointly maximizes the manager's expected utility and stock holders’ pay offs is around 25%, a rate close to the typical percentage (30%–35%) that is often found in initial public offering clawback (IPOC) contracts used in the corporate world.

Past fund performance does a poor job of predicting future outcomes. The reason is noise. Using a random effects framework, we reduce the noise by pooling information from the cross-sectional alpha distribution to make density forecasts for each individual fund’s alpha. In simulations, we show that our method generates parameter estimates that outperform alternative methods, both at the population and at the individual fund level. An out-of-sample forecasting exercise also shows that our method generates improved alpha forecasts. Received November 23, 2016; editorial decision November 1, 2017 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.

The difference between yields on nominal and inflation-linked government bonds or inflation swap rates are important indicators of the outlook for inflation and are monitored regularly by central banks, including the United Kingdom's Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). However, in the United Kingdom, inflation-linked instruments reference RPI inflation, whereas the MPC's target is CPI inflation of 2%. In this paper we extract market expectations for UK CPI inflation with the help of UK RPI-linked gilt prices, which is a novelty in the literature. To better extract useful information about expectations for CPI inflation, we develop a no-arbitrage term structure model and decompose the forward inflation curve into: measures of CPI inflation expectations; the expected wedge between RPI and CPI inflation; estimates of inflation risk premia and estimates of liquidity risk premia. We show that long-horizon expectations of CPI inflation fell in the 1990 s, after the introduction of inflation targeting and the creation of the MPC, and have since remained fairly stable at around 2%.

The risk of customers affects corporate financial policy by limiting the ability of firms to securitize customer receivables. We find that firms with riskier receivables, based on the credit risk and diversification of the firms' principal customers, have lower financing capacity and lower leverage in their asset-backed securitizations. Because securitizations are designed to create a very safe claim by separating the risk of the securitized assets from the risk of the originating firms, increases in the risk of the receivables directly inhibit originating firms' ability to securitize assets and indirectly inhibit the originating firms' access to external finance. The study highlights a novel link between the financing of supplier firms and the financial health of their customers and shows how an increase in risk can limit access to external capital.

We find that multi-bank holding companies (MBHCs) in the U.S. have lower insolvency risk than single-bank holding companies (SBHCs) at the parent level, but have significantly higher insolvency risk than the latter at the subsidiary level. Our results suggest that MBHC parents tend to benefit from the internal capital market while allowing for more risk-taking at the individual levels. We further find that the higher risk for MBHC affiliates is because of the organizational and geographic complexity at the MBHC parent level. Our results highlight the importance of government regulation on banks at both parent and subsidiary levels.

We aim to make two contributions to the literature on the effects of transaction costs on financial price volatility. First, by augmenting a double differencing approach with a research design with three ingredients (a common set of companies simultaneously listed on two stock exchanges, binding capital controls, and different timing of changes in transaction costs), we obtain a control group that has identical corporate fundamentals as the treatment group. We apply the research design to Chinese stocks that are cross-listed in Hong Kong and Mainland China. Second, we allow transaction costs to have different effects in markets with different maturity. We find a significantly negative relationship, on average, between stamp duty increase and price volatility. However, this average effect masks some important heterogeneity. In particular, when institutional investors have become a significant part of the traders’ pool, we find an opposite effect. Overall, our results suggest that a Tobin tax could work in an immature market, but can backfire in a more developed market.