We study a dynamic corporate investment problem where decisions have to be made collectively by a group of agents holding heterogeneous beliefs and adhering to a “utilitarian” governance mechanism in which each agent has a given influence in the decision. In this setting we show that: (i) group decisions are typically dynamically inconsistent, (ii) dynamic inconsistency leads to inefficient underinvestment, and (iii) the ability to trade securities among insiders or with outsiders may restore efficient investment decisions but it may, in some cases, lead to inefficient overinvestment. Our theory can help explain the empirical evidence on the effect of diversity of groups, such as corporate boards, on firms’ outcomes and, more generally, on the difference between group and individual behavior.

Capital utilization and market power crucially affect asset prices in an economy exposed to shocks that improve real investment opportunities through capital-embodied technological innovations. We embed these two mechanisms in a standard general equilibrium model and show that (i) the price of risk for investment shocks is negative under fixed capital utilization, but positive under sufficiently flexible capital utilization, and (ii) the equity return exposure to investment shocks is negative under perfect competition, but positive under high market power. We further show that, high market power, persistent components in technology growth, and a strong preference for early resolution of uncertainty are jointly important to quantitatively match the observed equity risk premium.