If controlling shareholders can divert profits, equity ownership is more concentrated the higher the stock returns correlation. A higher returns correlation reduces the benefits of diversification, giving rise to both a higher investment by the controlling shareholder in the asset that he controls and a lower investment by the non-controlling shareholders. The empirical analysis supports the predictions of the model: equity ownership is more concentrated in countries where the stock returns correlation is higher; moreover the intensity of the relationship between the stock returns correlation and ownership concentration is amplified by poor investor protection.

In this paper we study the optimal design of credit derivative contracts when banks have private information about their ability in the loan market and are subject to capital requirements. First, we prove that when banks are subject to a maximum loss capital requirement the optimal signaling contract is a binary credit default basket. Second, we show that if credit derivative markets are opaque then banks cannot commit to terminal-date risk exposure, and therefore the optimal signaling contract is more costly. The above results allow us to discuss the potential implications of different capital adequacy rules for the credit derivative markets.

Standard tests of portfolio efficiency neglect the existence of illiquid wealth. The most important illiquid asset in household portfolios is housing: if housing stock adjustments are infrequent, optimal portfolios in periods of no adjustment are affected by housing price risk through a hedge term and tests for portfolio efficiency of financial assets must be run conditionally upon housing wealth. We use Italian household portfolio data and time series on financial assets and housing stock returns to assess whether actual portfolios are efficient. We find that housing wealth plays a key role in determining whether portfolios chosen by homeowners are efficient.