A previous study finds evidence to support selection ability among active fund investors for equity funds listed in 1982. Using a large sample of equity funds, I find evidence that funds that receive more money subsequently perform significantly better than those that lose money. This effect is short‐lived and is largely but not completely explained by a strategy of betting on winners. In the aggregate, there is no significant evidence that funds that receive more money subsequently beat the market. However, it is possible to earn positive abnormal returns by using the cash flow information for small funds.
[We investigate whether skilled hedge fund managers are more likely to pursue unique investment strategies that result in superior performance. We propose a measure of the distinctiveness of a fund's investment strategy based on historical fund return data. We call the measure the "Strategy Distinctiveness Index" (SDI). We document substantial cross-sectional variations as well as strong persistence in SDI. Our main result indicates that, on average, a higher SDI is associated with better subsequent performance. After adjusting for risk, funds in the highest SDI quintile outperform funds in the lowest quintile by 3.5% in the subsequent year.]
[Despite extensive disclosure requirements, mutual fund investors do not observe all actions of fund managers. We estimate the impact of unobserved actions on fund returns using the return gap--the difference between the reported fund return and the return on a portfolio that invests in the previously disclosed fund holdings. We document that unobserved actions of some funds persistently create value, while such actions of other funds destroy value. Our main result shows that the return gap predicts fund performance.]
[We examine situations where the same fund manager simultaneously manages mutual funds and hedge funds. We refer to this as side-by-side management. We document 344 such cases involving 693 mutual funds and 538 hedge funds. Proponents of this practice argue that it is essential to hire and retain star performers. Detractors argue that the temptation for abuse is high, and the practice should be banned. Our analysis based on various performance metrics shows that side-by-side mutual fund managers significantly outperform peer funds, consistent with this privilege being granted primarily to star performers. Interestingly, side-by-side hedge fund managers are at best on par with their style category peers, casting further doubt on the idea that conflicts of interest undermine mutual fund investors. Thus, we find no evidence of welfare loss for mutual fund investors due to exploitation of conflicts of interest.]
We examine the extent to which a fund's cash flows are affected by the stellar performance of other funds in its family–and consequences of such spillovers. We show that star performance results in greater cash inflow to the fund and to other funds in its family. Moreover, families with higher variation in invetment strategies across funds are shown to be more likely to generate star performance. We argue that spillovers may induce lower ability families to pursue star-creating strategies. Consistent with our conjecture, families with high variation in investment strategies across funds significantly underperform low-variation families.
We examine whether time-varying investor demand affects hedge fund companies’ decision to start new funds. We find significantly more fund inceptions in hot markets than in cold markets. Funds opened in hot markets exhibit weaker long-term performance, shorter survival time, and greater fraud risk. Investor clientele also varies with market conditions. Investors in hot markets appear to be less sophisticated, which may provide opportunities for more low-quality funds to enter the industry. Overall, inceptions due to high investor demand are not in the best interest of investors.
A previous study finds evidence to support selection ability among active fund investors for equity funds listed in 1982. Using a large sample of equity funds, I find evidence that funds that receive more money subsequently perform significantly better than those that lose money. This effect is short‐lived and is largely but not completely explained by a strategy of betting on winners. In the aggregate, there is no significant evidence that funds that receive more money subsequently beat the market. However, it is possible to earn positive abnormal returns by using the cash flow information for small funds.
We investigate whether skilled hedge fund managers are more likely to pursue unique investment strategies that result in superior performance. We propose a measure of the distinctiveness of a fund's investment strategy based on historical fund return data. We call the measure the “Strategy Distinctiveness Index” (SDI). We document substantial cross-sectional variations as well as strong persistence in SDI. Our main result indicates that, on average, a higher SDI is associated with better subsequent performance. After adjusting for risk, funds in the highest SDI quintile outperform funds in the lowest quintile by 3.5% in the subsequent year.
[Does the mutual fund industry lose its best managers to hedge funds? We find that mutual funds are able to retain managers with good performance in the face of competition from a growing hedge fund industry. On the other hand, poor performers are more likely to leave the mutual fund industry. A small fraction of these poor performers find jobs with smaller and younger hedge fund companies, especially when the hedge fund industry is growing rapidly. Analogously, a small fraction of the better-performing mutual fund managers are retained by allowing them to manage a hedge fund side-by-side.]
We examine situations where the same fund manager simultaneously manages mutual funds and hedge funds. We refer to this as side-by-side management. We document 344 such cases involving 693 mutual funds and 538 hedge funds. Proponents of this practice argue that it is essential to hire and retain star performers. Detractors argue that the temptation for abuse is high, and the practice should be banned. Our analysis based on various performance metrics shows that side-by-side mutual fund managers significantly outperform peer funds, consistent with this privilege being granted primarily to star performers. Interestingly, side-by-side hedge fund managers are at best on par with their style category peers, casting further doubt on the idea that conflicts of interest undermine mutual fund investors. Thus, we find no evidence of welfare loss for mutual fund investors due to exploitation of conflicts of interest.