We investigate the impact of product market competition (PMC) on workplace health and safety violations. Our findings reveal that firms facing intense PMC have higher incidences of workplace safety standards violations and pay higher penalties for such offenses. By leveraging reductions in import tariffs as quasi-exogenous shocks, we demonstrate that competitive pressures significantly worsen these violations. The strategic orientations of firms, whether towards cost-cutting or product differentiation, markedly shape these outcomes. Furthermore, pressure from analysts amplifies the negative impact, while labor unionization helps mitigate these detrimental effects, highlighting the nuanced interplay between governance and market forces.

We hypothesize and show that the impact of a regulatory shock depends both on the shock itself and on how firms respond, which can itself depend on the firm's governance attributes. To explore this, we use the staggered passage of Universal Demand (UD) laws, which insulate managers from derivative lawsuits. We find that, on average, firms respond to UD laws by increasing risk-taking incentives (vega), thereby compensating for weaker external discipline, and incentivizing valuable risky investments. Corporate governance, institutional ownership, and CEO power influences the likelihood of adjusting compensation. The firms that do boost vega subsequently experience greater innovation, and a stronger market response to new product announcements. Our results help to reconcile extant findings on the effects of UD laws by showing that the beneficial impact of the laws is conditional on firms’ strengthening their CEOs’ risk-taking incentives, a choice affected by their latent governance arrangements.