Global bonds are international securities traded and settled efficiently in multiple markets. This paper examines global bonds to evaluate the effects of multimarket trading on corporate bond liquidity and pricing. The results show that global bonds are significantly more liquid than similar-sized domestic bonds of the same issuers, and their liquidity advantage is reflected in higher market valuations. These findings support microstructure models that predict a positive relation between the number of potential investors and liquidity in over-the-counter markets, and help explain the increasing use of global bonds by corporate issuers.

We examine in an event-study context what factors affect the relative performance of stocks during liquidity crises. We find that market risk, measured by the market beta, is not a good measure of expected abnormal stock returns on days with liquidity crises. Instead, abnormal stock returns during liquidity crises are strongly negatively related to liquidity risk, measured by the co-movement of stock returns with market liquidity. The degree of informational asymmetry and the ownership structure of the firm also help to explain abnormal stock returns on crisis days. Our findings have important implications for managing the liquidity risk of equity portfolios.

We use a unique sample of corporate bonds guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the US to test recent theories about why asset prices may diverge from fundamental values. A key feature of our study is access to proprietary data on the haircuts, funding costs, and inventory positions of the primary dealers making markets in the individual bonds. The results provide strong support for the cross-sectional implications of the safe-asset, intermediary-constraints, and search-frictions literatures. Furthermore, the results indicate that network topology may also play an important role in explaining mispricing.

Self-imposed risk limits effectively limit dealers' appetite for risks and their capacity to intermediate in Treasury markets in times of market stress. Using granular and high frequency regulatory data on US dealers' Treasury securities trading desk positions and desk-level Value-at-Risk limits, we show that dealers are more inclined to reduce their positions as they get closer to their internal risk limit, consistent with such limit being meaningful and costly for traders to breach. Dealers actively manage their inventories away from their limits by selling longer-term securities and requiring higher compensation to take on additional risks. During the height of the Covid-crisis in 2020, dealer desks that were closer to their VaR limits sold more Treasury securities to the Fed and accepted lower prices in the emergency open market operations. Our findings complement studies that link post-GFC bank regulations to market liquidity by showing that self-imposed risk limits can explain the risk-averse behavior by dealers, and provide a micro-foundation for the link between market volatility and market liquidity in dealer-intermediated OTC markets. In times of crisis, policy prescriptions such as deregulation alone may not be sufficient to induce risk-taking by dealer intermediaries. Moreover, to address market functioning issues, policy actions that address the funding costs of intermediaries would not be as effective as policies that remove risks from intermediary balance sheets directly.

We study the relation between hedge fund equity holdings and measures of informational efficiency of stock prices derived from intraday transactions as well as daily data. Our findings support the role of hedge funds as arbitrageurs who reduce mispricing in the market. Hedge funds invest in stocks that are relatively inefficiently priced, and the price efficiency of these stocks improves after hedge funds increase their holdings. Hedge fund ownership contributes more to efficient pricing than ownership by other types of institutional investors. However, stocks held by hedge funds experienced large declines in price efficiency during several liquidity crises.Received July 27, 2016; editorial decision January 07, 2017 by Editor Wayne Ferson.

To understand the nature of hedge fund managers’ skills, we study the implementation of risk arbitrage by hedge funds using their portfolio holdings and comparing them with those of other institutional arbitrageurs. We find that hedge funds significantly outperform a naive risk-arbitrage portfolio by 3.7% annually on a risk-adjusted basis, whereas non–hedge fund arbitrageurs fail to outperform the benchmark. Our analysis reveals that hedge funds’ superior performance does not reflect fund managers’ ability to predict or affect the outcome of merger and acquisition deals; rather, hedge fund managers’ superior performance is attributed to their ability to manage downside risk.

We exploit the 2020 Treasury market shock to analyze how external and internal constraints impact arbitrageurs. Using regulatory filings, we find that hedge funds reduced arbitrage activities and increased cash holdings, despite stable credit and low contemporaneous redemptions. Creditors’ regulatory and liquidity constraints were not propagated to hedge funds through repo—Treasury arbitrageurs’ predominant financing source. Fund-creditor borrowing data reveal more regulated dealers provided, and more important clients received, disproportionately higher funding. Value-at-risk reported by funds suggests internal risk constraints were binding. Our results support theoretical predictions that arbitrageur risk constraints and precautionary liquidity management can amplify market instability even when contemporaneous financing remains resilient.