We develop a new theory of information production during credit booms. Entrepreneurs need credit to undertake investment projects, some of which enable them to divert resources. Lenders can protect themselves from such diversion in two ways: collateralization, and costly screening that generates durable information about projects. In equilibrium, the collateralization-screening mix depends on the value of aggregate collateral. High collateral values make it possible to reallocate resources towards productive projects, but they also crowd out screening. This has important dynamic implications. During credit booms driven by high collateral values (e.g. real estate booms), economic activity expands but the economy’s stock of information on existing projects gets depleted. As a result, collateral-driven booms end in deep crises and slow recoveries: when booms end, investment is constrained both by the lack of collateral and by the lack of information on existing projects, which takes time to rebuild. We provide empirical support for the mechanism using US firm-level data.

We examine gender differences in career progression and promotions using personnel data from the European Central Bank (ECB) during the period 2003–2017. A gender wage gap emerges within a few years of hiring, despite broadly similar entry conditions. We also find a gender promotion gap before 2010 when the ECB issued a public commitment to diversity. Following this change, the promotion gap disappears. Using data on promotion applications, we find a gender application bias, partly driven by preferences for competition. Following promotion, women perform better in terms of salary progression.