Regulators are contemplating or mandating precise measurement of financial climate‐risk exposure to promote sustainable investments. We show that such mandates can be counterproductive in the presence of social funds that catalyze change by subsidizing the adoption of cleaner production technologies. Firms can exploit a social fund's impact motive by measuring their climate‐risk exposure imprecisely. This strategic imprecision prevents the fund from distinguishing between firms that require subsidies and those that would switch to clean technologies for financial reasons alone, thereby increasing the ex ante subsidies firms can extract. A by‐product of this rent‐seeking behavior is that firms adopt clean technologies more frequently than would be jointly efficient under precise measurement. Our analysis suggests that the regulatory push for precise climate‐risk measurement can reduce social funds' impact and the frequency of green transitions.

How can features of the markets for audit and nonaudit services (NAS) affect an audit firm's incentives to invest in audit quality, average audit quality, and social welfare? We address these questions in a model focusing on competition in both audit and NAS markets. We show that, when audit and NAS demand are positively correlated, prohibiting auditors from providing NAS to audit clients leads to higher investments in audit quality, but can decrease average audit quality if marginal clients switch to lower quality auditors. The effect on social welfare can be positive or negative, depending on the distribution of clients' service demands. General bans on auditor provision of NAS can, via similar channels, increase or decrease audit quality and social welfare. Overall, our findings suggest a more nuanced view of how regulating an auditor's provision of NAS might affect audit quality and social welfare, and are driven by the effects of multimarket competition on the auditor's incentives to invest in audit quality, rather than previously identified auditor independence or knowledge spillover channels.

We study the desirability of transparent accounting information for banks depending on their liability structure. In our model, a bank finances a long-term project with both uninsured and insured deposits. Although uninsured deposits increase rollover risk, they may also generate efficient liquidations. Importantly, a transparent regime provides timelier information about the project’s payoff than an opaque regime. We show that the transparent regime is surplus-enhancing when the amount of insured deposits is small, as the bank issues the optimal amount of uninsured deposits and transparency leads to efficient liquidations. Otherwise, when the amount of insured deposits is large, the cost of inefficient liquidations dominates, making the opaque regime optimal. In addition, the bank may favor transparency to reduce its funding cost even when it is surplus-decreasing. Overall, our results show that transparent accounting is not a panacea and provide some support for the “mark-to-funding” accounting rule.

We adopt a financial‐materiality approach in studying the costs and benefits of measuring greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions on social welfare. Production by firms internally generates direct GHG emissions (Scope 1 emissions) whereas outsourcing to suppliers generates indirect emissions (Scope 3 emissions). Our analysis incorporates two frictions: (1) long‐term negative environmental externalities caused by emissions and (2) fragmentation in regulating emissions disclosures across jurisdictions. We show firms' failure to internalize the environmental externalities provides a rationale for mandating Scopes 1 and 3 emissions disclosures. However, such disclosures induce emissions leakage. Disciplining emissions leakage calls for setting complementary—rather than independent—disclosure requirements for Scopes 1 and 3 emissions. Our analysis underscores the importance of improving the reliability of Scope 3 emissions measurements given that measurements of Scope 1 emissions are highly reliable for public firms in Europe and the United States. Regulators can further enhance the disciplinary effects of Scope 3 emission measurements by requiring the allocations of Scope 3 emissions in supply chains to individual firms, especially when allocating Scope 3 emissions is more reliable, and for firms/industries that are more prone to transition climate risk relative to physical climate risk.

We investigate how provisioning models interact with bank regulation to affect banks' risk‐taking behavior. We study an accuracy versus timeliness trade‐off between an incurred loss model (IL) and an expected loss model (EL) such as current expected credit loss model or International Financial Reporting Standards 9. Relative to IL, even though EL improves efficiency by prompting earlier corrective action in bad times, it induces banks to originate either safer or riskier loans. Trading off ex post benefits versus ex ante real effects, we show that more timely information under EL enhances efficiency either when banks are insufficiently capitalized or when regulatory intervention is likely to be effective. Conversely, when banks are moderately capitalized and regulatory intervention is sufficiently costly, switching to EL impairs efficiency. From a policy perspective, our analysis highlights the roles that regulatory capital and the effectiveness of regulatory intervention play in determining the economic consequences of provisioning models. EL spurs credit supply and improves financial stability in economies where intervening in banks' operations is relatively frictionless and/or regulators can tailor regulatory capital to incorporate information about credit losses.

We develop a model in which accounting information and prudential regulation interact to affect banks’ incentives to originate loans. Prudential regulators impose capital requirements to prevent banks from taking excessive risk. However, regulators cannot commit to ex ante efficient intervention and, instead, respond to ex post accounting information. We show that capital requirements and accounting measurement are substitutes when considered separately. By contrast, when considered jointly, accounting measurement and capital requirements are complementary tools that affect the level and efficiency of credit decisions. Comparative statics link capital requirements, quality of accounting information, and regulatory intervention to credit market conditions. An upshot of our analysis is that by appropriately optimizing the information from expected loss models, prudential regulators may design looser capital requirements to spur more bank lending.