Can taxes on consumption redistribute in developing countries? Contrary to consensus, we show that taxing consumption is progressive once we account for informal consumption. Using household expenditure surveys in 32 countries, we proxy for informal consumption using the type of store where purchases occur. We establish that the budget share spent in informal stores steeply declines with income, so that richer households pay a substantially larger share of their income in taxes. Our findings imply that the widespread policy of exempting food from taxation is hard to justify on equity grounds in low-income countries.

Households in developing countries often face variation in the prices of consumption goods. We develop a model demonstrating that in-kind transfers will provide insurance benefits against price risk if the covariance between the marginal utility of income and price is positive. Using calorie shortfalls as a proxy for marginal utility, we find that this condition holds for low-income Indian households. Expansions in India’s flagship in-kind food transfer program not only increase caloric intake but also reduce caloric sensitivity to prices. Our results contribute to ongoing debates about the optimal form of social protection programs.