Using Canadian data, I investigate the relationships among sectoral mobility, unemployment spells, and total unemployment. Recent North American evidence suggests that incidence shifts toward high wage-high tenure workers may increase equilibrium unemployment through decreasing sectoral mobility and increasing spells. Using a multiple spell transition model, I find that, while shifts toward such workers may have these effects, composition changes that lead to higher mobility can also increase unemployment. A further investigation into the relative roles of mobility and spell lengths in driving total unemployment indicates that the influence of the former is comparatively small.

The variances of pricing errors (transitory changes in prices) at the NYSE open and the close are analyzed for U.S. stocks that are traded in London or Tokyo, British and Japanese stocks that are listed on the NYSE, and U.S. stocks that are not traded abroad. The variance of pricing errors is significantly greater at the open than at the close for U.S. stocks, but not foreign stocks. These differences are explained by differences in order flow at the open and the close, a relation that is the same whether stocks are foreign or domestic and whether they trade abroad or notJournal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: G10, D23.

This paper investigates the relation between the form of compensation and the manager's decision horizon. It finds that while all-cash contracts induce managers to underinvest in the long term, all-stock contracts induce overinvestment in the long term. It shows that compensation contracts consisting of both cash and restricted stock can produce efficient investment, thereby providing a rationale for the existence of both cash and stock incentive schemes in executive compensation packages. This explains why the adoption of either type of incentive scheme results in a positive stock price reaction. In addition, the paper derives the following testable hypotheses: i) the proportion of the stock compensation is decreasing in the precision of the manager's ability and increasing in the precision of the firm's cash flows; ii) firms compensate their managers with proportionately more stock in profitable years and proportionately more cash in leaner years; and iii) the greater the growth opportunities, the higher the proportion of stock compensation.

This paper examines how analysts combine earnings and dividend information when they predict future earnings. Because both earnings and dividends are noisy indications of future earnings, we posit that analysts use the two corroboratively, to confirm the information reflected in each, and that analysts will substitute away from earnings when it is noisy and toward dividends. Using regressions of analysts' earnings forecast revisions on unexpected earnings, unexpected dividends, and five variables that reflect whether the signs of unexpected earnings and dividends confirm or contradict each other, we find evidence of both corroboration and substitution. Analysts' earnings forecast revisions are significantly related to the five corroborative variables, and this relation has statistically significant explanatory power beyond that in the magnitudes of unexpected earnings and unexpected dividends. Consistent with expectations, we find that the evidence of corroboration varies across the noisiness of earnings information; there is more evidence of corroboration when earnings are more variable. We also find evidence consistent with analysts substituting away from earnings, toward dividend information for firms with noisy earnings information (high variance). Overall, the results imply that analysts use earnings and dividend information interdependently, with some interdependency determined by the noisiness of earnings announcements. Résumé. Les auteurs examinent comment les analystes combinent l'information relative aux bénéfices et aux dividendes pour prévoir les bénéfices futurs. Les bénéfices et les dividendes étant tous deux des indicateurs imparfaits des bénéfices futurs, les auteurs posent l'hypothèse que les analystes utilisent les deux, à titre corroboratif, pour confirmer l'information que livre chacun de ces indicateurs et qu'ils préféreront les dividendes aux bénéfices, si ces derniers se révèlent un indicateur imparfait. En procédant à la régression des révisions des prévisions de bénéfices des analystes sur les bénéfices imprévus, sur les dividendes imprévus et sur cinq variables indiquant si les pronostics de bénéfices et de dividendes imprévus se confirment ou s'infirment les uns les autres, les auteurs enregistrent des données qui vont à la fois dans le sens de la corroboration et de la substitution. Les révisions des prévisions de bénéfices des analystes présentent une relation significative avec les cinq variables de corroboration, relation qui affiche un pouvoir d'explication statistiquement significatif, au‐delà de celui de l'ampleur des bénéfices imprévus et des dividendes imprévus. Conformément aux prévisions, les auteurs constatent que la preuve de corroboration varie selon le degré d'imperfection de l'information relative aux bénéfices; les preuves de corroboration sont plus fortes lorsque les bénéfices varient davantage. Les auteurs font également état de constatations conformes à l'hypothèse selon laquelle les ana lystes écartent l'information relative aux bénéfices pour y substituer l'information relative aux dividendes dans le cas d'entreprises dont l'information relative aux bénéfices est imparfaite (variance élevée). Dans l'ensemble, les résultats invitent à la conclusion que les analystes utilisent l'information relative aux bénéfices et aux dividendes de manière interdépendante, une partie de cette interdépendance étant déterminée par l'imperfection de l'information communiquée en ce qui a trait aux bénéfices.

This paper examines shares of fixed capital formation in GDP and rates of economic growth for more than 100 countries over successive five-year periods between 1965 and 1985 to determine the direction of causality between them. Simple regressions and multiple regressions including several standard determinants of growth, as well as a simple causality test, provide more evidence that increases in growth precede rises in rates of capital formation than that increases in capital formation precede increases in growth. High rates of fixed capital formation accompany rapid growth in per capita income, but we find no evidence that fixed investment is the only or main source of ignition for economic growth.

We examine aftermarket transactions for closed-end fund IPOs and document large sell-to-buy imbalances (“flipping”), extensive price stabilization, and sharp subsequent price drops. The timing of the price drop is related to both the amount of initial flipping, and use of the over-allotment options. The extent of the flipping activity is related to the composition of the syndicate. Moreover, aftermarket buys (sells) are mainly small (large) trades. These findings suggest that lead underwriters price stabilize and manage the supply of shares in the aftermarket, and that closed-end fund IPOs are marketed to a poorly informed public.

We investigate use of individual performance evaluation in CEOs' annual incentive plans. In contrast with relatively objective accounting and stock-price-based measures, individual performance evaluation may involve discretion and subjectivity, as well as nonfinancial and financial performance criteria. Based on agency theory, we predict that individual performance evaluation increases with the importance of growth opportunities relative to assets in place, length of product development and product life cycles, and noise in traditional financial measures. Using proprietary compensation data, we find evidence that individual performance evaluation increases with growth opportunities and product time horizon.

This paper examines the impact on the liquidity of NYSE/AMEX listed stocks when they were subsequently listed on the London or the Tokyo Stock Exchanges. It can be argued that the increased competition from foreign market makers will reduce the monopoly rents that specialists can earn, thereby improving their quotes. We find, however, that spreads do not decrease following a dual listing, though the depth of the quotes increases as predicted. The apparent increase in depth disappears once we account for changes in price, volume and return variance. We also find that the level of informed trading increases, which increases the cost to the specialist of providing liquidity, and explains why spreads do not decline in spite of increased competition. Consistent with an increase in informed trading, we also document an increase in trading activity.