Importance of the coal problem, 541. — I. Occasion for appointment of the Commission, 543. — The Federal Act of October, 1923, 547. — Personnel of the Commission, 548. — II. The bituminous branch of the industry; striking irregularity of production, 550. — The causes: seasonal demand, strikes, overdevelopment above all, 551. — Effects on labor, 559. — No radical remedy proposed by the Commission, 660. — Changes in railroad car distribution recommended, 561. — Readjustment of freight rates, 563. — The Commission fails to urge the use by the Interstate Commerce Commission of its power to veto building of lines or sidings not needed, 565. — III. Anthracite coal problems simpler, 566. — The fundamental problem is that of monopoly, 568. — The Commission proposes a graded tax on royalties, 570. — IV. Unionization and non-union fields, 572. — The Commission on the whole commends the United Mine Workers, condemns operators in non-union fields, yet takes a neutral attitude, 573. — V. The Reports have high educational value, the remedies suggested are inadequate, 577. — Some more far-reaching plan must come, 581.

Introduction: the alarmist and the fatalist attitude; the problems to be solved, 364. — I. Transportation Technique; how recent its great advances, 365. — Motor-truck possibilities, 368. — Centralized generation of power, 371. — II. Terminals, 371. — Unitary control inevitable, 374. — III. Consolidations, 375. — Future of the Transportation Act in this regard uncertain, 376. — Public advantage of consolidation, 377. — IV. Ownership and Control, 378. — Financial difficulties arising from the legal limitation of return, 380. — Possible eventual outcome: a few great corporations, mixed directorates, 382.

Journal Article Coöperative Production Among Shingle—Weavers Get access George M. Janes George M. Janes Washington and Jefferson College Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 38, Issue 3, May 1924, Pages 530–536, https://doi.org/10.2307/1882336 Published: 01 May 1924

BOTH the month-to-month fluctuations and the long-time trends of (a) loans and investments, and (b) net deposits of New York Clearing House banks are highly similar. For I903-I3, a period for which the fluctuations were carefully examined in a previous study, the correspondence between the seasonal and cyclical movements of the two series was found to be remarkably close and the slopes of the linear secular trends were shown to be identical.2 The range of fluctuations of the actual figures for net deposits, however, is much wider than that for loans and investments.3 Thus, in years of business depression, such as I904, I908, and I9II, when loans and investments of New York Clearing House banks rose to relatively high levels, it was found that net deposits rose even more. Also, in years of active business, such as I903, I906-07, and I910, when loans and investments declined to low levels, net deposits fell still lower. As a consequence of the lesser range of fluctuations of loans and investments 4 than of net deposits, the ratios of the items of the first series to corresponding items of the second series were found to exhibit marked cyclical movements. Furthermore, the timing and general contour of the cyclical movements of the curve representing the loan-deposit ratio were found to agree closely with those of the curve representing rates on commercial paper adjusted for seasonal influences. This agreement, for the ten or eleven years preceding the war, is evident from the comparison in Chart 2 of the loan-deposit ratio and rates on commercial paper.5 Thus the process of taking the ratio of loans and investments to net deposits of New York Clearing House banks results in a series fluctuating concurrently with money rates and, at least for the decade preceding the war, furnishes a supplementary index of money conditions. The crests and the troughs of the cyclical fluctuations of the loandeposit ratio, it should be noted, come at quite different times from those of the constituents of the ratio. That is, the trough of the curve for ratios comes in times of business depression and the early stages of business recovery, when the curves for loans and investments and net deposits of New York Clearing House banks are high; the crest of the curve for ratios comes in times of business prosperity and financial strain, when the curves for loans and investments and net deposits are low. The object of the present study is to ascertain if the loan-deposit ratio (or possibly, the loanliability ratio) is an accurate index of money conditions for other periods than the decade preceding the war and for other banks than those belonging to the New York Clearing House. The reason for studying the ratio of loans and investments to deposits (or, the ratio of loans and investments to total liabilities) rather than the individual series of loans and investments by itself is threefold. First, as stated above, the loan-deposit ratio furnished an accurate index

Journal Article Professor Edgeworth's Views on Index—Numbers Get access C. M. Walsh C. M. Walsh Bellport, N. Y. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 38, Issue 3, May 1924, Pages 500–519, https://doi.org/10.2307/1882334 Published: 01 May 1924

Journal Article New Books on the Principle of Population Get access C. P. Wright C. P. Wright Food Research Institute, Stanford University, Calif. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 38, Issue 4, August 1924, Pages 666–682, https://doi.org/10.2307/1884596 Published: 01 August 1924