We examine real outcomes for biotech startups going public around the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act. Reduced compliance costs associate with greater innovation capital formation as biotech IPO volume and proceeds increase after the JOBS Act. Biotechs, which conduct over 30% of IPOs since 2012, go public with products earlier in the FDA approval process and more frequently target rare diseases and cancer. Consistent with our survey evidence that managers use compliance savings to invest in R&D, we link the JOBS Act to post-IPO increases in project-level development, such as new patents, clinical trials, and staffing of laboratories. Post-JOBS Act product candidates are more likely to reach key milestones in the FDA approval process and these startups fail at lower rates. Benefits accrue to shareholders without sacrificing financial reporting quality. Our results demonstrate how tailoring regulations for startups can provide economic and societal benefits.

Predicted stock issuers (PSIs) are firms with expected high-investment and low-profit profiles that earn extremely low returns. We evaluate alternative explanations for this empirical phenomenon. Our results show top-PSI firms are cash-strapped, have lottery-like payoffs, high volatility, high beta, low liquidity, and high shorting costs. Over the next 2 years, top-PSI firms earn return on assets of −30% per year, report disappointing earnings, and experience strongly negative forecast revisions. They perform poorly in down markets and are six times more likely to delist for performance-related reasons. Overall, we find substantial support for mispricing, some support for nonstandard preferences, and virtually no support for the risk explanation.

Through textual analyses of 7.7 million patents, we develop a novel intercompany innovation similarity measure which enables us to find that technologically connected firms cross-predict one another’s returns. Investors impound information about firms’ technological connectedness, although not immediately and fully. Buying (shorting) shares of technological peers earning high (low) returns during the previous month yields a 1.29% monthly return. Firms’ return predictability increases with patent complexity or limited technological disclosures but decreases with better information transparency. Results suggest that investor inattention explains technology momentum. Unlike momentum stemming from simpler, class-based technological links, our Big Data text-based return predictability remains active.

Eric M. Leeper of Department of Economics, University of Virginia reviews “A Monetary and Fiscal History of the United States, 1961-2021” by Alan S. Blinder. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Examines monetary and fiscal policy in the United States since the 1960s, chronicling how stabilization policy struggled to fight recessions, unemployment, and inflation.”

Many of the events that trigger clawback provisions are associated with risky corporate policies and variable performance outcomes. We propose and test the hypothesis that clawback provisions motivate managers to reduce firm risk. Panel ordinary least squares, general method of moments with instrumental variables, and propensity square matching models all indicate that clawback provisions decrease the volatility of stock returns. The channels that connect clawback presence to firm risk include more conservative investment and financial policies. The clawback-induced reduction in risk-taking appears to benefit shareholders on average. The gains from reduced risk-taking are larger for firms with fewer growth options, lower R&D, and prior wrongdoing.

Bloomfield, Marvão, and Spagnolo (2023) establish an interesting yet puzzling finding: Firms in concentrated industries that form cartels are more likely to use relative performance evaluation (RPE) compensation arrangements for their top managers. The paper interprets this as evidence that cartel members constrain managers' incentives to engage in costly sabotage when their compensation depends on their peer firms' performance. I argue that successful costly sabotage to gain an RPE advantage is extremely unlikely and that costly sabotage is more likely among cartel firms than non-cartel firms. It therefore is an unlikely explanation of the paper's main finding. I propose an alternative explanation, that RPE benchmarks include firms that are not cartel member firms.

We use Call Report data to examine the effects of the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) and the PPP Liquidity Facility (PPPLF) on small business and farm lending by individual commercial banks. As program participation was associated with small business lending, we adopt an instrumental variables approach to identify causal implications based on historical bank relationships with the Small Business Administration and the Federal Reserve’s discount window. Our results indicate that both programs encouraged lending growth over the first half of 2020. However, while the PPP encouraged greater lending across all banks, only small and medium-sized bank lending growth was significantly related to participation in the PPPLF.

Using hand-collected data on corporate bond and stock offerings, we identify the impact of government debt on corporate financing during World War I. The early twentieth century provides a unique opportunity to identify the impact of government debt on private financing because during this period (1) firms announced the amount they wanted to raise before each security offering and (2) the Treasury issued debt in discrete intervals. We identify the impact of Treasury issues by comparing differences in the amount firms offered to the amount they actually raised when the Treasury was borrowing to when the Treasury was not in the market. We find that long-term government bond offerings negatively affect both amount of long-term corporate bonds and dividend paying stocks issued. In contrast, we find no effect on short-term debt issue. Our findings suggest that investors view stable dividend paying stocks a close substitute for relatively safe long-term bonds.

Rachel M. McCleary of Harvard University reviews “The Economics of Religion” edited by Robert M. Sauer. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Twelve papers examine the interconnection between religiosity and economic principles, highlighting future directions for research in the emerging field of the economics of religion.”