Loss aversion is one of the most widely used concepts in behavioral economics. We conduct a large-scale, interdisciplinary meta-analysis to systematically accumulate knowledge from numerous empirical estimates of the loss aversion coefficient reported from 1992 to 2017. We examine 607 empirical estimates of loss aversion from 150 articles in economics, psychology, neuroscience, and several other disciplines. Our analysis indicates that the mean loss aversion coefficient is 1.955 with a 95 percent probability that the true value falls in the interval [1.820, 2.102]. We record several observable characteristics of the study designs. Few characteristics are substantially correlated with differences in the mean estimates. (JEL D81, D91)

We use bank-firm matched data to study how the capital buffers that large U.S. banks must satisfy to “pass” the Federal Reserve's stress tests impact banks’ lending and firms’ loan volumes, overall debt, investment, and employment. We find that larger stress-test capital buffers lead to reductions in banks’ lending, modest increases in loan rates and spreads, and reductions in new loan originations. However, we do not find an impact of higher capital buffers on firms’ overall debt, investment, and employment, suggesting that firms find other credit sources to substitute for the reduction in loans from banks that participate in the stress tests.

We examine the relation between venture capital (VC) investments, M&A activity, and merger competition laws in 45 countries around the world. We find evidence of a strong positive association between VC investments and lagged M&A activity, consistent with an active M&A market providing viable exit opportunities for VC companies and therefore incentives for venture capitalists to invest. We also explore the effects of country-level merger competition laws and pro-takeover legislation passed internationally on VC activity. We find significant reductions in VC activity in countries with stricter competition laws and find that VC activity intensifies after the enactment of country-level takeover-friendly legislation. (JEL G15, G24, D43, K21, L26)

How does lending-market competitiveness shape new firms’ financing? Using a unique U.S. representative panel of new firms, we document that in more concentrated local lending markets: (a) new firms are less likely to access credit; (b) new firms have lower leverage; and (c) the best-performing firms are more severely affected by reduced debt financing. We develop a contingent-claims model with monopolistically competitive banks that rationalizes these facts and shows how credit-market conditions determine loan fees and concentration. Our findings highlight banks’ market power as a channel through which the financial sector influences firms’ development and, hence, economic growth. (JEL D82, G21, G32, G34, L26)

M. Lee Pelton of The Boston Foundation reviews “What Universities Owe Democracy” by By Ronald J. Daniels. The Econlit abstract of this book begins: “Promotes the argument that colleges and universities are essential to the flourishing of liberal democracy, suggesting that these institutions have a responsibility to act in defense of the liberal democratic experiment.”

We examine the relative importance of audit firm versus partner decision styles in key audit matter (KAM) reporting. Standard setters intended KAMs to increase the usefulness of the audit report by requiring the partner‐led engagement team to disclose engagement‐specific information about the most significant judgments they made during the audit. However, stakeholders expressed widespread concern that audit firms' longstanding efforts toward standardization would result in generic KAMs at the audit firm level and provide partners little opportunity or incentive for engagement‐specific reporting. We evaluate this high‐stakes tension between standard setters' goals for audit reporting and auditors' deep‐rooted practices by leveraging data from the United Kingdom, which has required partner identification since 2009 and expanded audit reports since 2013. We find that clients sharing the same partner receive KAMs that are 10% more textually similar than clients with different partners. In contrast, clients sharing the same audit firm receive KAMs that are just 2% more textually similar than clients with different audit firms. This implies that partner decision styles are more important in influencing KAM outcomes than audit firm styles. Collectively, our results suggest that partners make unique KAM reporting judgments, countering concerns that audit firms' efforts toward standardization will yield boilerplate KAMs. This evidence extends the literature on expanded audit reporting and partner decision styles and provides valuable insights into a contemporary issue in audit regulation with broader implications for understanding dynamics within the profession.

Research suggests that the standard model used to detect opportunistic shifting of core expenses to special items is potentially biased. Such bias has been attributed to the use of accruals, including special item related accruals, as a control for the impact of performance on core earnings in this model. This paper provides an improved classification shifting model which both tests for such accruals-related bias and controls for other sources of error in the measurement of shifting. The paper also modifies conventional market rationality tests in accounting research to examine new dimensions of rationality in relation to measurement and valuation of shifting. The main empirical findings are as follows. First, the improved classification shifting model provides strong evidence of shifting and rejects the hypothesis that inclusion of accruals in the model causes bias. Second, estimates of shifted core expenses generated by the improved model exhibit forecasting properties of shifted earnings. Third, rationality test results are broadly consistent with rationality in relation to shifted core expenses but indicate possible partial (ir)rationality in relation to adjusted special items (i.e., special items excluding shifted core expenses). Further analysis of the latter findings, however, suggests they are more likely related to risk than irrationality. Overall, the paper contributes to improved measurement of shifting and highlights the importance of considering rational expectations when examining stock returns associated with shifting.

This study empirically examines whether firms reclassify related-party payments to avoid the base erosion and anti-abuse tax (BEAT) of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA). We leverage the BEAT filing threshold and use both a difference-in-differences design among U.S. firms and a triple-difference design utilizing the parent company's location to provide evidence that firms reclassify related-party payments to avoid the BEAT. This effect is stronger in firms with greater pre-TCJA income shifting incentives. We estimate a $6 billion aggregate reduction in U.S. taxes for our sample firms in 2018. We also examine the consequences of reclassifying related-party payments and find some evidence of an increase in tax reserves and a reduction in internal information quality for firms that engage in cost reclassification to avoid the BEAT. These findings help explain observed BEAT collection shortfalls, contribute to the current policy debate about international tax reform, and document spillover effects of tax policy.

In 2017, the PCAOB began requiring audit firm tenure disclosure within the audit report for SEC registrant clients. Many commenters raised the concern that prominent disclosure of firm tenure would lead investors to inappropriately infer a negative relation between audit quality and long tenure. This is particularly troubling given that empirical evidence generally does not support this concern. In our first experiment, we predict and find that disclosing an audit firm's long tenure within the audit report increases investors' perceptions that the audit firm's independence was impaired while conducting the audit. However, we also identify an intervention that mitigates the effects of disclosing long tenure—an accompanying disclosure in the audit report of the firm's adherence to the SEC's mandatory partner rotation requirement. We find that such a disclosure moderates the effect of long tenure disclosure such that in the absence (presence) of a partner rotation disclosure, investors do (do not) perceive increased independence impairment when long firm tenure is disclosed. In a second experiment, we predict and find that long firm tenure disclosure reduces investors' preference to invest in an otherwise quantitatively optimal investment and that this relation is driven, in part, by perceptions of independence impairment. Again, this result is attenuated by partner rotation disclosure. Our results should be useful to regulators in understanding the effects of their disclosure mandate and to audit firms in understanding a practical way in which they might mitigate the implications of such effects.