In this review article, I read a book that revolves around two papers published in 1954, one by Lionel McKenzie, and the other by Kenneth Arrow and Gérard Debreu—Till Düppe and E. Roy Weintraub’s Finding Equilibrium: Arrow, Debreu, McKenzie and the Problem of Scientific Credit (2014). Under a tripartite categorization of people, context, and credit, this book advances the claim that “by being applied, interpreted, shaped, and reshaped, [these] proofs came to symbolize a new intellectual culture in American economics and help reconstruct the body of economic knowledge” (Düppe and Weintraub 2014, p. 204). My reading leads me to contest this claim, and also to contest whether a history of economic analysis, much less a history of economic thought, can be written by taking refuge in the vernacular of ancillary discourses orthogonal to the subject matter whose history is being written, and without the disciplinary criteria that these discourses operate under. An unintended consequence of my reading is the identification of lacunae in the reception of these proofs, an underscoring of Paul A. Samuelson’s panoramic vision, and a reemphasis of the sterling contributions of David Gale, Thomas Kuhn, Hukukane Nikaido, and Hirofumi Uzawa.

Journal Article Some Equivalence Theorems Get access M. Ali Khan M. Ali Khan Johns Hopkins University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Review of Economic Studies, Volume 41, Issue 4, October 1974, Pages 549–565, https://doi.org/10.2307/2296705 Published: 01 October 1974

Journal Article Social Opportunity Costs and Immiserizing Growth: Some Observations on the Long Run Versus the Short Get access M. Ali Khan M. Ali Khan Johns Hopkins University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 97, Issue 2, May 1982, Pages 353–362, https://doi.org/10.2307/1880763 Published: 01 May 1982

The core is the set of all allocations that cannot be blocked by any coalition no matter how improbable is its formation. Extending the insights of the Continuum School, this article shows that restrictions placed on the formation of coalitions do not enlarge the core very much if the finite economy is large. (Из Ebsco)

I look at `trust' in the light of two constructions taken from economic science: general competitive analysis and the theory of games. I draw on Baier's anti-contractarian perspective, as well as on one informed by Wittgenstein's writings. The former focuses on relations between inherently unequal and asymmetrical individuals, while the latter draws on and revolves around the imperative in the Philosophical Investigations: “Let the use teach you the meaning” [p. 212; also p. 220]. I try to spell out how the choice of language has epistemological implications: for an analysis of trust, for the trustworthiness of the scientific constructions I use for analyzing trust, and thereby, more generally, for defining `ourselves' and our `form of life.'

In this paper we report a generalization of the results of Foley and Guesnerie on the second welfare theorem to economies with arbitrary nonconvex production sets. The nature of marginal cost prices in such economies is clarified through the use of the Clarke tangent cones.

We prove the existence of approximate equilibria in exchange economies, giving bounds on the excess demand in terms of the number of traders and norms of the endowments, but independent of the preferences.