The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 and recently modified exchange listing requirements impose uniformly high levels of outside director monitoring on all firms. However, recent research in finance suggests that corporate governance structures, including boards of directors, are chosen endogenously by firms in response to their unique operating and contracting environments. Using the relative costs and benefits of outside director monitoring as a benchmark, I find significant cross-sectional variation in the wealth effects around the announcement and passage of these regulations. I find that firms which have high monitoring-costs and fewer benefits from outside monitoring benefited less from the regulations. In particular, I find that the wealth effects around the passage of these new regulations are positively related to firm size and age, and negatively related to growth opportunities and the uncertainty of the firm's operating environment. The results suggest that a blanket “one size fits all” governance regulation maybe detrimental to certain firms, particularly young, small, growth firms operating in uncertain business environments, that are costly for outsiders to monitor.

[We analyze a comprehensive set of mergers and acquisitions from SDC data from 1992 through 2009. We do not impose common restrictions such as excluding private bidders, small targets, or deals without a deal value. We show a broader scope of mergers and acquisitions activity than that implied in the literature, which generally oversamples larger deals involving public firms. Further, some of our results differ from the extant literature. For example, the finding that mergers occur in waves is attenuated with a greater presence of smaller and/or non-public firms. Also, acquirers gain in most takeovers despite a threefold decline over the sample period in acquirer returns.]

We present evidence that, following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, firms responded to the increased requirement for outside director monitoring by substituting insiders with outside directors who have social or professional connections to their CEOs. This substitution was most significant in firms that have higher outside director monitoring costs – small, young firms, firms outside the S&P 1500 index, and firms with low analyst scrutiny. The addition of these “friendly” directors did not reduce firm performance, suggesting that it may have been an efficient response by firms aimed at lowering the additional monitoring costs imposed by the new regulations. Our findings suggest that, as with many other aspects of board composition, the determinants and consequences of appointing friendly directors vary with the costs and benefits of outside director monitoring.

A long-recognized phenomenon in capital markets is the underinvestment in foreign equity securities, known as equity home bias. Our study examines the effect of board independence on the firm's ability to attract foreign equity capital. After accounting for potential endogeneity, we document that U.S. and non-U.S. foreign investors exhibit a strong preference for firms with more independent corporate boards. Further, our analysis indicates that the positive relation between board independence and foreign ownership is significantly stronger in countries with less developed legal institutions and poor external protection of investor rights. We suggest that it is in these countries that firm-determined characteristics such as independent boards can be most beneficial in attracting capital. We also find that institutional investors are more responsive to the impact of independent corporate boards than are other types of investors.

We document that fund managers are more likely to allocate assets to firms managed by executives and directors with whom they share a similar political partisan affiliation. We find that this bias is not associated with improved fund performance. Funds with more partisan bias suffer from higher levels of idiosyncratic volatility than those with less bias. Partisan bias is more evident when fund managers are less experienced, in more informationally opaque firms, and when the U.S. president comes from fund managers’ own party. These findings suggest that political partisan bias among fund managers may be due to in-group favoritism.

The use of research and development (R&D) spending as an empirical proxy for managerial discretion, information asymmetry and growth opportunities, is pervasive in empirical corporate finance research. Underlying this is the implicit assumption that firms choose levels of R&D to maximize value, given firm and industry characteristics. An alternative framework views the level of R&D spending as subject to idiosyncratic behavior as managers myopically manipulate R&D expenditures to meet short-term earnings goals. Using aggregate firm and industry level data, we find evidence consistent with the view that R&D is determined by firm and industry characteristics. Time invariant firm and industry fixed effects explain most of the cross-sectional variation in observed R&D spending, while time-varying factors like size, profitability, or market-to-book explain little of the cross-sectional variation. We find that R&D spending continues to grow faster than advertising and capital expenditures. We also find no evidence of managerial myopia as corporate aggregate R&D expenditures are growing faster than aggregate profitability and the number of firms that undertake R&D has increased over the period from 1976 to 2010.

We show that R&D investment explains a significant portion of the increase in the average cash-to-assets ratio of U.S. firms, which more than doubled between 1980 and 2012. In 1980, an average firm held $0.04 in cash for $1.00 of R&D spending, but this had increased to $0.60 by 2012. The increasing sensitivity of cash holdings to R&D investment and the increase in R&D spending of the typical firm explain over 20% of the increase in aggregate cash holdings. Intensified domestic and global competition appears to be an important explanation for the increased propensity of R&D-intensive firms to hoard cash.

We find that firms with CFOs who have extensive social connections within the finance industry hold less precautionary cash. CFO connections matter more than CEO connections, reflecting the preeminence of CFOs among C-level executives in cash management and negotiating access to corporate finance. Firms reduce the proportion of assets held in cash by seven percentage points in the two years following CFO turnover and the appointment of a CFO with finance industry connections. The stock market valuation of incremental cash holdings of firms with well-connected CFOs is lower than for other firms, consistent with investor recognition of CFO social capital as an alternative means to address constraints on external capital.

We provide evidence that sophisticated investors like short sellers, option traders, and financial institutions are more informed when trading stocks of companies with more connected board members. For firms with large director networks, the annualized return difference between the highest and lowest quintile of informed trading ranges from 4% to 7.2% compared to the same return difference in firms with less connected directors. Sophisticated investors better predict outcomes of upcoming earnings surprises and firm-specific news sentiment for companies with more connected directors. Changes in board connectedness are positively associated with changes in measures of adverse selection.

We revisit the information content of stock trading by corporate insiders with an expectation that opportunistic insiders will spread their trades over longer periods of time when they have a longer-lived informational advantage, and trade in a short window of time when their advantage is fleeting. Controlling for the duration of insiders' trading strategies, we find robust new evidence that both insiders' sales and purchases predict abnormal stock returns. In addition, we provide evidence that insiders attempt to preserve their informational advantages and increase their trading profits by disclosing their trades after the market has closed. When insiders report their trades after business hours, they are more likely to engage in longer series of trades, they trade more shares overall, and their trades are associated with larger abnormal returns. Finally, we show how accounting for these trading patterns sharpens screens for corporate insiders who trade on infor- mation.