To get a more complete picture of how labor supply is affected by economic incentives, the effects on absenteeism should be taken into account. In particular, absenteeism due to sick leave can be considerable. We examine whether the level of sick leave compensation affects sick leave behavior. Using long time series data (1955–99) for Sweden with numerous changes of the compensation level, we generally find strong effects. Reforms implying more generous compensation for sick leave tend to be associated with permanent increases in sick leave, and vice versa. These findings are reinforced in a panel study covering the 1983–91 period.

The deterioration of economic performance in Sweden from about 1970 was to some extent result of a number of exogenous shocks and unnecessary policy mistakes. It was, however, also related to basic changes in economic and social system in Sweden in late 1960s and early 1970, when government spending, taxes, and regulations started to expand dramatically. It is also argued in paper that problematic political, economic, and social mechanisms had become embedded in long-term dynamics of system itself. These various experiences are background for recent reforms and retreats of the Swedish experiment.