In spite of the conspicuous use of the Internet as a delivery channel, there is a relative dearth of empirical studies that provide a quantitative analysis of the impact of the Internet on banks’ financial performance. This paper attempts to fill this gap by identifying and estimating the impact of the adoption of a transactional web site on financial performance using a sample of 72 commercial banks operating in Spain over the period 1994–2002. The impact on banks’ performance of transactional web adoption takes time to appear. The adoption of the Internet as a delivery channel involves a gradual reduction in overhead expenses (particularly, staff, marketing and IT). This effect is statistically significant after one and a half years after adoption. The cost reduction translates into an improvement in banks’ profitability, which becomes significant after one and a half years in terms of ROA and after three years in terms of ROE. The paper also concludes that the Internet is being used as a complement to, rather than a substitute for, physical branches.

We study the optimal joint design of prudential supervision and deposit guarantee regulations in a multi-country, integrated banking market, where policy-makers have preferences regarding profitability and stability of the banking sector. Non-coordinated policies will tend to yield too little supervision and too much deposit insurance. The paper concludes with recommendations on policy priorities in this area.

In the context of the proposed EU financial supervisory reforms, this paper focuses on the governance of the network of national supervisory banking agencies and the newly established Community supervisor (European Banking Authority, EBA). We assess to what extent lack of governance convergence nationally and with EBA could undermine the incentives for cooperation among supervisors. Convergence should particularly focus on (i) the issue of the presence of politicians on decision-making bodies; (ii) the need for clearly defining dismissal procedures of heads of supervision; (iii) autonomy from government in regulatory matters; (iv) supervisory autonomy in matters of licensing and withdrawing licenses; (iv) mechanisms for judicial accountability; (v) legal protection for supervisors handling in good faith. In the absence of full centralization of prudential supervision, early harmonization of national governance arrangements towards best practice would better align supervisors’ incentive structures and, hence, be beneficial for the effectiveness of European supervision.

Using international listed banks from the United States, Europe, Japan and China from 2004 to 2014, we analyze the effect on banks’ risk of some of the most relevant new elements of the prudential regulatory framework proposed after the Financial Crisis. We measure risk by a market measure, the volatility of banks’ stock returns. We also examine the effect of government support during the financial crisis and designation as a G-SIB. We find little support for an association with government support and none for a negative relationship. We find support for a positive effect of designation as a G-SIB on risk. We find a positive association with securities trading and a negative association with capital. Banks´ chosen liquidity is unimportant for this measure of risk.

We extend the literature on the sovereign-bank nexus by examining the composition effects of sovereign portfolios on banks' risk profile, unlike previous studies which generally analyzed the determinants of banks’ sovereign portfolios or the size effects of these portfolios. We also differ from previous studies with respect to the measures of risk considered and by covering a sample period that goes well beyond the Global Financial Crisis (2009–2018). Drawing on granular data from the European Banking Authority, we find that banks are riskier when their portfolio includes a higher proportion of securities that are issued by higher risk sovereigns or when they are themselves domiciled in a country with high sovereign credit risk. But we do not find concluding evidence that larger holdings of government securities of the country where the bank is incorporated increase bank risk ex-post. However, the risk profile is higher for banks that received government capital injections than for banks that did not receive capital support in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis. Banks that received government capital injections are less risky when their portfolio includes a higher proportion of securities that are issued by higher risk sovereigns. These results may indicate that regulatory arbitrage motives at these banks are particularly important.

Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) provides a more efficient mechanism for dealing with problem banks operating in more than one European country. In a PCA framework, a bank's losses are likely to be substantially reduced. This reduction in the losses to deposit insurance and governments will improve the problem of allocating those losses across the various insurance schemes and make it less likely that any deposit insurer will renege on its obligations in a cross-border banking crisis. This paper presents a stylized mechanism aimed at dealing with the cross-border agency problems that arise in supervising and resolving cross-border banking groups in the European Union (EU). The authors assume that PCA policies have been implemented by the national supervisors and explore the institutional changes needed in Europe if PCA is to be effective as an incentive compatible mechanism. The paper identifies these changes starting with enhancements in the availability of information on banking groups to supervisors. Next, the paper considers the collective decision making by supervisors with authority to make discretionary decisions within the PCA framework as soon as a bank of a cross-border banking group falls below the minimum capital standard. Finally, the paper analyzes the coordination measures that should be implemented if PCA requires the bank to be resolved.

This paper analyzes the determinants of bank acquisitions both within and across countries in the EU-25 over the period 1997–2004. Our results suggest poorly managed banks (high cost to income) and larger banks are more likely to be acquired by other banks in the same country. The probability of being a target in a cross-border deal is larger for banks that are quoted in the stock market. Finally, banks operating in more concentrated markets are less likely to be acquired by other banks in the same country but are more likely to be acquired by banks in other EU-25 countries.

We analyze the takeover premiums paid for a sample of domestic and cross-border bank takeovers in the European Union between 1997 and 2007. We find that acquiring banks value profitable, high-growth and low risk targets. We also find that the strength of bank regulation and supervision as well as deposit insurance regimes in Europe have measurable effects on takeover pricing. Stricter bank regulatory regimes and stronger deposit insurance schemes lower the takeover premiums paid by acquiring banks. This result, presumably in anticipation of higher compliance costs, is driven by domestic deals. Similar qualitative results are found for both the entire sample and the sample of publicly traded targets.