This paper examines the value of government ownership in Europe during the global financial crisis. This crisis was an exogenous shock for European firms, which allows us to observe an out-of-equilibrium effect on the costs and benefits of government ownership. Using a comprehensive sample of 4737 listed firms in 28 European countries over the period 2005–2009, we find that firms with government ownership experienced a smaller reduction in firm value than firms without government ownership. This effect was driven by firms located in countries where the risk of expropriation by the government is lower, that is, countries with less corruption and better investor protection.

We investigate whether investor protection and taxation legislation affect dividend policy, using a unique sample of all Belgian firms listed on the Brussels Stock Exchange between 1838 and 2012. Investor protection was very weak in Belgium before World War I, but gradually improved over time. Dividend taxation was introduced only in 1920. While it is generally believed that investor protection and taxation affect dividend policy, we find that dividend policy has been remarkably stable over time, even after controlling for firm characteristics. Changes in investor protection and taxation legislation seem to have had little impact on dividend policy.