[Using over 5,000 trades unequivocally based on nonpublic information about firm fundamentals, we find that asymmetric information proxies display abnormal values on days with informed trading. Volatility and volume are abnormally high, whereas illiquidity is low, in equity and option markets. Daily returns reflect the sign of private signals, but bidask spreads are lower when informed investors trade. Market makers’ learning under event uncertainty and limit orders help explain these findings. The cross-section of information duration indicates that traders select days with high uninformed volume. Evidence from the U.S. SEC Whistleblower Reward Program and the FINRA involvement addresses selection concerns.]

[Despite extensive disclosure requirements, mutual fund investors do not observe all actions of fund managers. We estimate the impact of unobserved actions on fund returns using the return gap--the difference between the reported fund return and the return on a portfolio that invests in the previously disclosed fund holdings. We document that unobserved actions of some funds persistently create value, while such actions of other funds destroy value. Our main result shows that the return gap predicts fund performance.]

We examine the risk-taking behavior of money market funds during the financial crisis of 2007–2010. We find that (1) money market funds experienced an unprecedented expansion in their risk-taking opportunities; (2) funds had strong incentives to take on risk because fund inflows were highly responsive to fund yields; (3) funds sponsored by financial intermediaries with more money fund business took on more risk; and (4) funds suffered runs as a result of their risk taking. This evidence suggests that money market funds lack safety because they have strong incentives to take on risk when the opportunity arises and are vulnerable to runs.

We study the impact of the zero lower bound interest rate policy on the industrial organization of the U.S. money fund industry. We find that in response to policies that maintain low interest rates, money funds: change their product offerings by investing in riskier asset classes; are more likely to exit the market; and reduce the fees they charge their investors. The consequence of fund closures resulting from interest rate policy is the relocation of resources in affected fund families and in the asset management industry in general, as well as decline in capital of issuers borrowing from money funds.

Using over 5,000 trades unequivocally based on nonpublic information about firm fundamentals, we find that asymmetric information proxies display abnormal values on days with informed trading. Volatility and volume are abnormally high, whereas illiquidity is low, in equity and option markets. Daily returns reflect the sign of private signals, but bid-ask spreads are lower when informed investors trade. Market makers’ learning under event uncertainty and limit orders help explain these findings. The cross-section of information duration indicates that traders select days with high uninformed volume. Evidence from the U.S. SEC Whistleblower Reward Program and the FINRA involvement addresses selection concerns. Received January 11, 2017; editorial decision December 17, 2018 by Editor Andrew Karolyi.

We show theoretically that the responsiveness of a fund manager's portfolio allocations to changes in public information decreases in the manager's skill. We go on to estimate this sensitivity ( RPI ) as the R 2 of the regression of changes in a manager's portfolio holdings on changes in public information using a panel of U.S. equity funds. Consistent with RPI containing information related to managerial skills, we find a strong inverse relationship between RPI and various existing measures of performance, and between RPI and fund flows. We also document that both fund‐ and manager‐specific attributes affect RPI .

We study the distributional effects of asset ownership on price informativeness in a general equilibrium model. The model features investors (oligopolists) with different degrees of price impact and abilities to learn about individual asset payoffs from private and price signals, and a competitive fringe that only learns from asset prices. We show that price informativeness is non-monotonic in the oligopolists’ aggregate size, decreasing in the sector’s concentration and in the size of the passive sector. We further show that the size effect can be decomposed into a learning channel capturing investors’ quality of private signals and an information pass-through channel measuring the sensitivity of investors’ trades to private signals, with the latter one being the primary source of variation in price informativeness relative to the size distribution.

In their indisposed paper, Aswani, Raghunandan, and Rajgopal (ARR) provide a critique of our main findings on the pricing of carbon transition risk in Bolton and Kacperczyk (2021a, 2021b, 2022) and in Bolton, Halem, and Kacperczyk (2022). We take exception to the key elements of their critique. The main findings of their analysis do not contradict our findings. Rather, they corroborate some of our own findings. However, they choose to take a different interpretation from ours based on selective evidence. A large asset-pricing literature seeks to explain the cross-sectional pattern of stock returns based on exposures to aggregate risk factors such as size and book-to-market ratios or firm-specific risk linked to observable firm characteristics. In our empirical studies, we have systematically explored whether investors demand a carbon risk premium as compensation for their exposure to carbon transition risk. We have looked at how stock returns vary with CO2 emissions across firms, industries, and countries and have found consistent evidence around the world of a carbon risk premium for stock returns, and a carbon valuation discount for price–earnings and book-to-market ratios. We have further found that the carbon premium has jumped after the Paris agreement. There was no significant premium right before the Paris agreement but a highly significant and large premium after the agreement.

Sustainable finance—the integration of environmental, social, and governance (“ESG”) issues into financial decisions—is an increasingly important topic. Within companies, sustainability is no longer an ancillary issue confined to corporate social responsibility departments, but a CEO-level issue fundamental to the core business. Within the investment industry, sustainability used to be the exclusive domain of “socially responsible investors” who had social as well as financial objectives, but is now mainstream and includes investors with purely financial goals. This article introduces the RF Special Issue on Sustainability. It highlights three reasons for the rapid rise in sustainable finance—its financial relevance, its contribution to nonfinancial objectives, and investor tastes. It then summarizes the eight articles in the Special Issue, in particular drawing out their contributions to the literature. Finally, we offer ideas for future research.

The authors study the impact of a powerful nonfinancial stakeholder—unionized workers—on the pricing of corporate debt. Firms in more unionized industries have lower bond yields. This relation is stronger in firms with weaker financial conditions and cannot be explained by the correlation of unionization with industry characteristics, governance mechanisms, or financial leverage. Firms in unionized industries implement less risky investment policies and are less likely targets of acquisitions. Unionization reduces yields by more when firms’ takeover barriers are lower. Hence, unions are viewed favorably in the bond market because, through their influence on corporate affairs, they protect bondholders’ wealth.