This paper demonstrates that the market reaction to announcements of seasoned stock offerings varies with the presence of outside agents - accounting firms, commercial banks, and underwriters - who monitor the firm. The stock price reaction is a positive function of the quantity of bank debt in a firm's financial structure, the quality of the firm's investment banker, and the quality of the public accounting firm that serves as its external auditor. The evidence supports theoretical models that imply external agents audit, monitor, and certify decisions to issue seasoned common stock.

In this paper, the authors examine the market valuation effects of corporate saleleasebacks. Specifically, they test whether such transactions offer a net benefit to lessees or lessors by evaluating the impact on share prices from announcements of saleleasebacks of major corporate assets. Their evidence indicates that the announcements are associated with positive abnormal returns to lessees. They conclude that this positive market reaction results from an overall reduction in the present value of expected taxes occasioned by the transactions. The evidence also suggests that the gains from saleleasebacks accrue solely to lessee firms.

In this paper, we examine the market valuation effects of corporate sale‐and‐leasebacks. Specifically, we test whether such transactions offer a net benefit to lessees or lessors by evaluating the impact on share prices from announcements of sale‐and‐leasebacks of major corporate assets. Our evidence indicates that the announcements are associated with positive abnormal returns to lessees. We conclude that this positive market reaction results from an overall reduction in the present value of expected taxes occasioned by the transactions. Our evidence also suggests that the gains from sale‐and‐leasebacks accrue solely to lessee firms.