We examine the relationship between ownership structure and corporate crime. Our approach draws upon two lines of research: (1) the theory of the firm which poses ownership as a critical incentive mechanism and (2) the economic theory of corporate crime, which emphasizes the role played by top management in affecting crime in the corporation. We find that crime occurs less frequently among firms in which management has a larger ownership stake. Our results imply that penalizing `corporations' (shareholders) deters crime, and that corporate crime tends not to benefit shareholders, ex ante. Rather than being something shareholders have encouraged, corporate crime appears to reflect an agency cost limited but not optimally eliminated through the costly efforts of top management. The evidence is consistent with the notion that ownership structure plays an important role in aligning the hidden actions of top management with the shareholder interest.

Previous studies that attempt to relate environmental to financial performance have often led to conflicting results due to small samples and subjective environmental performance criteria. We report on a study that relates the market value of firms in the S&P 500 to objective measures of their environmental performance. After controlling for variables traditionally thought to explain firm-level financial performance, we find that bad environmental performance is negatively correlated with the intangible asset value of firms. The average ‘intangible liability’ for firms in our sample is $380 million—approximately 9% of the replacement value of tangible assets. We conclude that legally emitted toxic chemicals have a significant effect on the intangible asset value of publicly traded companies. A 10% reduction in emissions of toxic chemicals results in a $34 million increase in market value. The magnitude of these effects varies across industries, with larger losses accruing to the traditionally polluting industries.