We observe a persistent increase in the percentage of firms with little or no debt in their capital structure over the last three decades. The fraction of firms with less than five percent debt in their capital structure increases from 14.01 percent in 1977 to 34.42 percent in 2010 while the percentage of all-equity firms increases 200 percent over the same period. We find that even after controlling for firm- and industry-specific variables that are relevant to capital structure policy, there is a deficiency in firms' propensity to be levered. Additionally, the deficiency is increasing over time and by 2010 the percent of firms that are nearly all-equity is twice the predicted level. Our findings are robust to different methodologies, specifications, and time periods. Overall, these results suggest that the well-documented benefits of leverage are less valuable over the sample period and that the determinants of firms' capital structure decisions have evolved since the 1970s.

This study establishes a significant positive relation between high quality auditors and long-run post-IPO equity performance. IPOs associated with high-ranked auditors benefit from superior information quality irrespective of underwriter rank, manifesting in significantly better post-IPO equity performance. The auditor certification effect is robust and persists longer than the underwriter certification effect. IPOs, regardless of the underwriter rank, benefit significantly from the auditor reputation effect. Further, the auditor certification effect is more pronounced: (a) when underwriter certification is weak (‘substitution effect’), and (b) in the presence of greater information asymmetry. VC backed IPOs perform significantly better; however, VC reputation has no effect, after controlling for auditor rank and underwriter certification. Our conclusions are reinforced by a battery of robustness checks, including the use of alternative methodologies to address endogeneity, audit quality proxies, performance metrics, model specifications, and validity tests.

The median U.S. non-regulated firm reports a 47% decline in leverage ratio between 1980 and 2010. We investigate whether the cost-benefit tradeoff to shareholders, captured by the valuation impact of an additional dollar of debt on owners' equity, is an explanation for the observed change in leverage. Using Faulkender and Wang (2006) methodology, we find that shareholders view increasing debt to have a negative impact on their wealth, that is, shareholders perceive firms to be over-levered. Further, the net cost of issuing additional debt has increased steadily for three decades beginning in 1980 before declining marginally after 2010. This trend holds for different groups of firms classified on factors known to affect capital structure decisions. Managers respond to the changing cost to shareholders by reducing (increasing) leverage when the cost of debt increases (decreases). The time-series pattern in the marginal cost of debt persists after controlling for firm-specific characteristics. We find that macroeconomic factors, such as federal debt, play a role in explaining the marginal value of debt.

This is the first study to examine the post-IPO stock price performance by differentiating between IPOs and three types of RLBOs (i.e. public-to-private (or re-IPOs), division-to-private, and private-to-private deals). We document that public-to-private RLBOs outperform their industry rivals, IPOs, mature firms in comparable industries, and a propensity-score matched control group for up to five years post-offering. Further, we document that, within RLBOs, public-to-private RLBOs, outperform private-to-private and division-to-private RLBOs. We also find support for the underwriter signaling effect for public-to-private RLBOs. Our analysis identifies for the first time what private period restructuring activities contribute to superior post-re-IPO stock price performance. Further, the beneficial effects of private period restructurings are enhanced for deals associated with prestigious underwriters. Our findings suggest that first IPOs and re-IPOs differ substantially in term of post-offer performance, the impact of prestigious underwriters on performance, and performance over time.