This paper examines why large private equity (PE) funds earn lower returns. The article argues that large PE funds are suited to making large investments and small PE funds are suited to nurturing start-ups. Thus, the suboptimal investment in small companies is one driver of the size effect in PE. A theoretical model and empirical results from a sample of 1,222 funds in the USA support this prediction. The largest 25% of PE funds earn internal rates of return of 5.17% when they invest in the largest 25% of companies but only −2.98% when they invest in the smallest 25%. This suggests that investment size is a driver of the size effect in PE.

This paper uses the EU takeover directive as a natural experiment to test when legal harmonization creates value, and to examine the impact of increased entrenchment on investment decisions. The EU promulgated the takeover directive in April 2004. The implementation deadline was May 2006. The goal was to encourage value-creating takeovers by harmonizing takeover laws across the EU. However, the takeover directive has received criticism for being vague and discretionary, and for entrenching managers. I hypothesize that because the directive hinders takeovers, it might increase managerial entrenchment and enable managers of EU-companies to make agency-motivated investments (or simply exercise less discipline). I find supportive evidence: after the directive, EU-companies make investments that are less profitable (as proxied by takeover returns) and that take longer to compete. Further, asset growth increased in treated companies following the takeover directive, suggesting that the additional entrenchment facilitates empire building.

This paper examines diversification as a source of value creation and destruction in private equity (PE) funds. Previous literature has focused on the “diversification discount” in corporations. However, in PE funds, diversification might increase returns by ameliorating managerial risk aversion and facilitating knowledge sharing. I examine a sample of 1,505 PE funds and show that industry and geographic diversification can increasePE fund returns. This is likely due to knowledge sharing and learning, not merely risk reduction. Diversification can reduce returns if it spreads staff too thinly across industries or is motivated by risk aversion rather than performance bonuses.

Companies are sometimes accused of misleading the market. The SEC can punish this with enforcement actions. Alternatively, shareholders can seek redress through a shareholder class action (SCA). Thus, using a sample of 416 securities class actions, this paper shows that SCAs are a catalyst to promote disciplinary takeovers, CEO turnover and pay-cuts, and harm CEOs’ future job-prospects.

This article proposes an empirically tractable way to incorporate intra-day noise into a VWAP trading rule. In volatile markets, news arrives unexpectedly and rapidly. This should influence a trader’s trading decisions. However, the literature has not incorporated such information into an algorithmic trading framework. Subsequently, this paper presents a Dynamic VWAP (DVWAP) framework that allows informed traders to utilize random news; and thus, improve trade-execution.

This study highlights the link between stock return volatility, operating performance, and stock returns. Prior studies suggest that there is a ‘low volatility’ anomaly, where firms with a low stock return volatility out-perform firms with a high stock return volatility. This paper confirms that low volatility stocks earn higher returns than high volatility stocks in emerging markets and developed markets outside of North America. We also show that low volatility stocks have higher operating returns and this might explain why low volatility stocks earn higher stock returns. These results provide a partial explanation for the ‘low volatility effect’ that is independent from the existence of market anomalies or per se inefficiencies that might otherwise drive a low volatility effect. We emphasize the importance of controlling for stock return volatility when analyzing operating performance and stock performance.

The literature posits that some CEO overconfidence benefits shareholders, though high levels may not. We argue that adequate controls and independent viewpoints provided by an independent board mitigates the costs of CEO overconfidence. We use the concurrent passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and changes to the NYSE/NASDAQ listing rules (collectively, SOX) as natural experiments, to examine whether board independence improves decision making by overconfident CEOs. The results are strongly supportive: after SOX, overconfident CEOs reduce investment and risk exposure, increase dividends, improve postacquisition performance, and have better operating performance and market value. Importantly, these changes are absent for overconfident-CEO firms that were compliant prior to SOX.

This paper analyzes the role of foreign VCs in driving venture success in emerging markets. We analyze a comprehensive data set of 4753 portfolio companies from China. We test whether the presence of a foreign VC increases the likelihood that a portfolio company is successfully exited. We find that the presence of a foreign VC does not per se significantly increase the likelihood of a successful exit. However, the likelihood of a successful exit increases if the foreign VC collaborates with a joint venture (JV) partner. Further, the impact of foreign VC backing depends on the nature of the VC, with foreign VCs tending to perform better when investing in late-stage companies and when they are diversified across industries. If a foreign VC successfully exits an investment, then, compared with a domestic-VC, it prefers to exit via a M&A or secondary-buyout than via an IPO, reflecting the significant lock-up periods associated with VC-backed IPOs in China, the difficulty of achieving a foreign listing, and the difficulty listing a start-up on Chinese markets.

The market for corporate control is generally regarded as an important disciplinary mechanism in well developed economies. Entrenchment mechanisms commonly used by US firms in the form of anti-takeover provisions (ATPs) may offer some protection from disciplinary action, facilitating entrenchment and value-reducing behavior. One manifestation of entrenchment is poor acquisitions, with the literature reporting significant losses to large acquirers, and to acquirers with a higher number of ATPs. We examine the profitability of acquisitions in Australia, a market where US-style ATPs are prohibited. The results show that unlike their US counterparts, large Australian acquirers earn significant value for their shareholders, both in terms of announcement returns and long-run operating performance improvements. Takeover premiums are also substantially lower than those reported for the US and UK, and do not differ between large and small acquirers. Premiums are also positively correlated with long-run operating performance, indicating that they reflect real synergies, as opposed to hubris or overpayment. We also find that bidders who destroy value in takeovers are likely to be subsequently acquired. However, unlike US evidence, larger acquirers are just as likely to be targeted for takeover as smaller acquirers, indicating that size is not an effective impediment to the disciplining function of the market for corporate control in Australia. The findings are robust to several econometric issues common to the type of models used in our analysis.

This paper examines the relationship between acquirer size, sovereign governance, and value-creation in acquisitions. Prior literature indicates that larger acquirers' acquisitions create less shareholder wealth in developed markets, arising primarily from agency and entrenchment problems. However, in weak governance environments, size might have off-setting benefits, including increased market power and political connections. We use a sample of 17,647 takeovers from 45 countries to examine the acquirer size effect around the world. We find that the acquirer size effect exists internationally, but is smaller in magnitude in weak governance markets. Compared with larger acquirers in strong governance countries, large acquirers in weak governance countries do takeovers that generate higher stock-returns and increase post-takeover operating performance. Their deals are also more likely to be friendly, and take less time to complete. We also find that the benefits of larger acquirer size increase with the importance of political connections in the acquirer's country. The results suggest that country-governance can moderate the impact of corporate characteristics, such as corporate size.