That parents transfer resources to children because of altruistic concern is a reasonable a priori assumption. However, economic theories of altruistic transfers have produced many counterintuitive conclusions, and, consequently, much debate. When applied to bequests, these theories predict that inheritances will compensate for earnings differences between siblings as well as between parents and children. This paper tests these implications. Using a new data set centered on federal estate tax returns, little support can be found for an altruistic theory of bequests. This finding has implications for macroeconomic policy, government transfer programs, and inequality.

This paper estimates economic models of the determinants of state benefit levels in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program using 1969–1992 data. These models have been extensively researched; however, the existing literature has produced an unacceptably wide range of estimates. Using alternative econometric procedures, this paper systematically examines both the specification assumptions underlying previous analyses as well as several additional specification issues. It is, therefore, able to replicate and reconcile estimates from previous studies and to provide updated, consensus estimates of the demand for welfare generosity. It finds that changes in the average level of income within states have small but statistically significant positive effects on benefits with the confidence bounds on the elasticity extending from 0.11 to 0.82. Changes in the effective price of redistribution are found to have, at most, weak negative effects with elasticities in the range of -0.14 to 0.02. These results are used to evaluate the effects of block grant provisions in the recently enacted welfare reform legislation.

This study theoretically and empirically examines altruistic and joy-of-giving motivations underlying contributions to charitable activities. The theoretical analysis shows that in an economy with an infinitely large number of donors, impurely altruistic preferences lead to either asymptotically zero or complete crowd-out. The paper then establishes conditions on preferences that are sufficient to yield zero crowd-out in the limit. These conditions are fairly weak and quite plausible. An empirical representation of the model is estimated using a new 198692 panel of donations and government funding from the United States to 125 international relief and development organizations. Besides directly linking sources of public and private support, the econometric analysis controls for unobserved institution-specific factors, institution-specific changes in leadership, year-to-year changes in need, and expenditures by related organizations. The estimates show little evidence of crowd-out from either direct public or related private sources. Thus, at the margin, donations to these organizations appear to be motivated solely by joy-of-giving preferences. In addition to addressing the basic question of motives behind charitable giving, the results help explain the existing disparity between econometric and experimental crowd-out estimates.