This paper presents estimates of how an increase in welfare benefits for the welfare-eligible affects the provision of parental support in the form of both financial transfers and shared residence based on an overlapping-generations framework incorporating game-theoretic interactions among parents, their adult children, and the government. The empirical results, obtained from two longitudinal data sets, indicate that the parents view a dollar of income earned by their daughters as equivalent to a dollar increase in welfare benefits. However, there exists only a small trade-off between the generosity of government aid and the incidence of parental aid.

03 We show how comparisons between the within-twin correlations of human capital outcomes across identical and nonidentical twins can be used to identify the variability in the individual-specific component of endowments and the responsiveness of schooling to individual-specific endowments in the family and in the marriage market even when schooling is measured with error. Estimates from two twins samples indicate that 27 (42) percent of the variance in log earnings (obesity) is due to variability in individual-specific endowments, allocations of schooling reinforce specific endowments, and individual-specific earnings endowments of men and their wives' schooling are negatively associated.

Andrew D. Foster, Mark R. Rosenzweig, A Test for Moral Hazard in the Labor Market: Contractual Arrangements, Effort, and Health, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 76, No. 2 (May, 1994), pp. 213-227

03 We show how comparisons between the within-twin correlations of human capital outcomes across identical and nonidentical twins can be used to identify the variability in the individual-specific component of endowments and the responsiveness of schooling to individual-specific endowments in the family and in the marriage market even when schooling is measured with error. Estimates from two twins samples indicate that 27 (42) percent of the variance in log earnings (obesity) is due to variability in individual-specific endowments, allocations of schooling reinforce specific endowments, and individual-specific earnings endowments of men and their wives' schooling are negatively associated.