DuPont analysis, a common form of financial statement analysis, decomposes return on net operating assets into two multiplicative components: profit margin and asset turnover. These two accounting ratios measure different constructs and, accordingly, have different properties. Prior research has found that a change in asset turnover is positively related to future changes in earnings. This paper comprehensively explores the DuPont components and contributes to the literature along three dimensions. First, the paper contributes to the financial statement analysis literature and finds that the information in this accounting signal is in fact incremental to accounting signals studied in prior research in predicting future earnings. Second, it contributes to the literature on the stock market's use of accounting information by examining immediate and future equity return responses to these components by investors. Finally, it adds to the literature on analysts' processing of accounting information by again testing immediate and delayed response of analysts through contemporaneous forecast revisions as well as future forecast errors. Consistent across both groups of market participants, the results show that the information is useful as evidenced by associations between the DuPont components and stock returns as well as analyst forecast revisions. However, I find predictable future forecast errors and future abnormal returns indicating that the information processing does not appear to be complete. Taken together, the analysis indicates that the DuPont components represent an incremental and viable form of information about the operating characteristics of a firm.

We examine whether the properties of bond ratings from certified agencies (designated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)) differ from those of non-certified bond-rating agencies. Bond ratings from non-certified agencies are used solely for investment advice. Certified ratings are used by a variety of constituents, many of whom write contracts incorporating these ratings. We find that the properties of the ratings from the two agency types differ in predictable ways. Our results show that the non-certified agency's ratings are consistent with their role of providing information to investors. The certified agency is generally more conservative, consistent with their significant role in contracting.

We provide evidence consistent with firm managers opportunistically defining non-GAAP earnings in order to meet or beat analyst expectations. This result is robust to controlling for other tools of benchmark beating (e.g., discretionary accruals, real earnings management, and expectation management). We also find that managers tend to exclude more expenses from non-GAAP earnings when it is costlier to use accrual earnings management due to balance sheet constraints, indicating that these tools are substitutes. Lastly, we find that investors discount positive earnings surprises when accompanied by exclusions from GAAP earnings, suggesting that the market partially understands the opportunistic nature of these exclusions. Our evidence is consistent with managers opportunistically defining non-GAAP earnings in a way that analysts fail to fully anticipate, resulting in an increased likelihood of exceeding analyst forecasts.

ABSTRACT We investigate the stock returns subsequent to quarterly earnings surprises, where the benchmark for an earnings surprise is the consensus analyst forecast. By defining the surprise relative to an analyst forecast rather than a time‐series model of expected earnings, we document returns subsequent to earnings announcements that are much larger, persist for much longer, and are more heavily concentrated in the long portion of the hedge portfolio than shown in previous studies. We show that our results hold after controlling for risk and previously documented anomalies, and are positive for every quarter between 1988 and 2000. Finally, we explore the financial results and information environment of firms with extreme earnings surprises and find that they tend to be “neglected” stocks with relatively high book‐to‐market ratios, low analyst coverage, and high analyst forecast dispersion. In the three subsequent years, firms with extreme positive earnings surprises tend to have persistent earnings surprises in the same direction, strong growth in cash flows and earnings, and large increases in analyst coverage, relative to firms with extreme negative earnings surprises. We also show that the returns to the earnings surprise strategy are highest in the quartile of firms where transaction costs are highest and institutional investor interest is lowest, consistent with the idea that market inefficiencies are more prevalent when frictions make it difficult for large, sophisticated investors to exploit the inefficiencies.