ABSTRACT This address reviews macrofinance from the perspective of resilience. It argues for a shift in mindset, away from risk management toward resilience management. It proposes a new resilience measure, and contrasts micro‐ and macro‐resilience. It also classifies macrofinance models in first‐ (log‐linearized) and second‐generation models, and links the important themes of macrofinance to resilience.

We develop a model to compare the governance of traditional shareholder-owned platforms to that of platforms that issue tokens. A traditional shareholder governance structure leads a platform to extract rents from its users. A platform that issues tokens for its services can mitigate this rent extraction, as rent extraction lowers the platform owners’ token seigniorage revenues. However, this mitigation from issuing “service tokens” is effective only if the platform can commit itself not to dilute the “service token” subsequently. Issuing “hybrid tokens” that bundle claims on the platform’s services and its profits enhances efficiency even absent ex-ante commitment power. Finally, giving users the right to vote on platform policies, by contrast, redistributes surplus but does not necessarily enhance efficiency.

The price of a safe asset reflects not only the expected discounted future cash flows but also future service flows, since retrading allows partial insurance of idiosyncratic risk in an incomplete markets setting. This lowers the issuers’ interest burden. As idiosyncratic risk rises during recessions, so does the value of the service flows bestowing the safe asset with a negative β. The resulting exorbitant privilege resolves government debt valuation puzzles and allows the government to run a permanent (primary) deficit without ever paying back its debt, but the government faces a debt Laffer curve.

Abstract We study the run on the German banking system in 1931 to understand whether depositors anticipate which banks will fail in a major financial crisis. We find that deposits decline by around 20% during the run. There is an equal outflow of retail and nonfinancial wholesale deposits from both failing and surviving banks. In contrast, we find that interbank deposits almost exclusively decline for failing banks. Our evidence suggests that banks are better informed about which fellow banks will fail. In turn, banks being informed allows the interbank market to continue providing liquidity even during times of severe financial distress.