Organizations increasingly operate in uncertain environments, requiring employees to revise task strategies to remain effective. We examine how pay for performance (PFP) influences adaptive performance following unanticipated change and argue that process accountability moderates this effect. Although PFP increases effort, it hinders adaptation by reinforcing persistence with an existing task strategy. Process accountability channels PFP-induced motivation into deeper strategic deliberation, enabling adaptation. We test our predictions in an experiment manipulating compensation (PFP versus flat wage) and process accountability (absent, reflection-only, and present), with participants in the reflection-only condition privately reflecting on their decision-making to isolate the social-evaluative component. Results show that PFP, relative to a flat wage, decreases adaptive performance when process accountability is absent, has no significant effect under reflection-only, and increases it when process accountability is present. Additional analyses suggest that strategic deliberation partially explains this effect. The findings underscore pairing PFP with process accountability to foster adaptation. Data Availability: Data are available upon request.