We show that the effect of regulation on credit rating informativeness depends on asset complexity. Using the Dodd-Frank Act as a shock to the rating industry, we analyze the impact of rating changes on market prices, conditioning on various measures of complexity. Rating informativeness improves after Dodd-Frank, but not for assets with high complexity. Our results are robust to alternative measures of informativeness and provide strong evidence that the impact of regulation varies in the cross-section of securities. Our findings are consistent with models combining rating shopping with rating agencies that strategically decide on information acquisition and rating inflation.

Liquidity injections by central banks have become frequent and massive, but their real effects on corporate investment remain unclear. We examine the longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs) of the European Central Bank (ECB) during the eurozone sovereign crisis and show that greater LTRO funding to banks is associated with lower corporate investment. Riskier banks received funds through the LTROs and subsequently increased their holdings of risky sovereign debt. Corporate investment reductions are associated with these banks. Further, concurrent fiscal and regulatory policies impeded the effectiveness of the ECB liquidity injections. Our findings identify the contributing factors for these failures of monetary policy.